



Report on the Mexico Conference Insight from the debate

The Fall Conference 2015 in Mexico took an in-depth look at the domestic side of the state monopoly on the use of force. Following a recap of issues discussed at the previous conference (the theory and concept of the state, identity politics), the core concern for this conference was introduced with a comparative review of patterns and developments in seven regions (Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northeast and Southeast Asia, Post-Soviet Space, South Pacific, Europe/OECD, Middle East).

As in the reports from the previous conferences, we want to recap important areas of growing convergence in the group that will be important points of reference for its further proceedings and for the final report.

MULTILAYERED SECURITY AS A REALITY – MERELY ACKNOWLEDGE OR ENDORSE?

A first overview of takeaways from the previous meetings was presented by Herbert Wulf on behalf of the chairs and FES. It highlighted the differences between the present international security architecture compared to the conception of national monopolies on the use of force. The task of the Reflection Group should be to suggest a concept of organizing an international order »between them.« It was stated that we see a »multi-level or multi-layered system, including differentiated formal and informal regulatory regimes (...).« These »(...) make the functioning of the concept of a state monopoly on the use of force unrealistic. The terms 'multi-level,' 'multi-layered,' 'polycentric,' 'assemblages,' or 'hybrid' more adequately describe the complexity, fluidity, fuzziness, and network character of the international system and its formal and informal institutions and actors.« In the course of the Mexico debate there was a strong tendency to use the term multilayered predominantly to describe the current state of security provision.

While the analysis was shared, the question repeatedly arose, whether we merely acknowledge the current multilayered security architecture as it is, or whether we should even endorse it. There were some substantial concerns about endorsing such a multilayered and fragmented reality as a normative aspiration. The original suggestion from Herbert Wulf's »takeaway paper« might provide a feasible alternative between the two extremes of merely acknowledging the existence of a multilayered security architecture and endorsing it: »It is suggested here that the already existing multiple layers of authority are *transformed and restructured* into a system of shared authority. We prefer the term multi-level or multi-layered to polycentric, suggesting an instituted relationship.«

Framed and emphasized this way, this would entail a clear three-pronged message:

- We need to **acknowledge a reality** that is to some extent in stark contrast to the ideal of national monopolies of force in an international order and rather **resembles a multilayered and fragmented system of security provision** with a variety of multiple actors.
- Yet, **we do not endorse the fragmented** and in many regards **deficient reality of a multilayered system of security provision** as it exists now, since in too many cases it provides *highly exclusive security provision for certain elites or groups* only.
- However, we could **endorse the vision of a better-coordinated and more accountable multilayered system of security provision** with shared and public accountability as both more realistic and feasible than a simplistic »return« to a supposedly ideal-typical world of perfect nation states.

Disclaimer – The more, the murkier: As the discussion about regional developments illustrates (see below), the continued trend of further fragmentation

and proliferation of security actors proves to be highly problematic in many regards. Combined with another recurring finding, namely that even large, capable states already face increasing problems in ensuring adequate oversight over their more consolidated public and commercial security providers, another implicit conclusion seems to be that the general *trend of further fragmentation and proliferation of security actors needs to be stopped.*

THE ROLE OF IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY,

With regard to ideology it was argued that after the supposed »end of history« (Fukuyama), the declining appeal of global ideologies (except perhaps for the varieties of neoliberalism) led to a return of a different sort of identity politics. At the expense of other forms of identity (universal ideologies and national identities alike), more primordial types of identity (religion and ethnicity!) have been tapped as sources of mobilization by political and violence entrepreneurs. The media and social networks exacerbate this trend. Such driving factors were identified as being behind the dramatic trend of political fragmentation over the last two decades. Mentioned as exemplary developments were the Dayton and Orid Accords in the 1990s, which featured an institutionalization of ethnic differentiation as a basis for ending protracted violent conflicts. These and other cases, it was argued, underline the potentially grave implications of identity politics for the monopoly on the use of force: Nation-state-based monopolies on the use of force would crumble under the pressure of those primordial identity politics. In the course of the debate about this line of argument, two important qualifications were stressed:

1. the distinction between national and primordial identities is not really clear-cut. Both these types of identities are constructed, with the main difference being that the supposedly »natural character« of primordial identities was not challenged in the same way as national identities were.
2. the argument would not apply equally to all regions of the world, as the subsequent comparative sessions underline.

With regard to the implications of the argument, some important questions also came up: If the problem was mobilization along the lines of primordial identities and the consequent challenge to national monopolies on the use of force, does that imply that we would need to strengthen national identities and nationalism as an antidote? It was quickly agreed that nationalism in any chauvinistic sense would not be considered a viable alternative strategy. Instead, a decoupling of the »national« from the nation state would be called for in

order to organize the state and the monopoly of force across such primordial dividing lines. The Reflection Group needs to come to an assessment of what this will imply for the formulation in the final report.

THE STATE OF THE ART OF THE ART OF STATES – DIFFERENT ACADEMIC ANGLES ADD VALUE

The conference profited immensely from the variety of academic angles on the subject. Two were particularly prominent: On the one hand a perspective focusing on the political economy of violence, security and the monopoly on the use of force and its challenges. On the other hand a perspective that focused more on normative aspects of human agency like trust and ideology and their implications. Especially the discussion about the nature of the state as the bearer of the monopoly on the use of force profited from a multi-perspective analysis. One contribution to the conference stressed the difficulty of defining the state (its fuzziness and ambivalence, its centrality and importance) and argued that the autonomy of the state is a »powerful fiction.« Critique of the liberal concept of the nation state comes from different perspectives, including those highlighting the hidden purposes of the state, as well as post-colonial and feminist interpretations. »Feeling like a state« presupposes a shared culture and common interest, which is seldom clearly spelled out. To get to grips with the issue of the nation state we expect to receive a conceptual paper on »Theorizing the state in times of uncertainty« from Siddhart Mallavarapu.

Perhaps the strongest message emerging from this debate, however, focused on the »performance« dimension of the state. With respect to very different strands of social, political, and anthropological theory – as well as some evidence based-research projects – it was stressed that the state relies on the day-to-day performance of its functions in order to be accepted as »a state.« This constructivist core was also emphasized in the course of the subsequent discussions, with examples from very different regions.

REGIME SECURITY VS. HUMAN SECURITY?

One of the most important reasons under discussion for a critical analysis of the state pertains to a distinction that seems to be obvious on first sight: It is important whether state security organs are employed to ensure citizen security or regime security. Authoritarian governments claim and often possess a monopoly on the use of force, but their legitimacy is often more than questionable. They employ security forces to violently

repress opposition and establish a surveillance state in order to retain political power and extract rents from their influential positions.

Yet, despite its catchy and plausible nature, this easy distinction needs further qualification. While authoritarian state elites may indeed employ the security apparatuses in such an illegitimate manner, this does not necessarily imply that the whole state and security apparatus are illegitimate and that they do not in parallel provide legitimate elements of security to the population, too. And sometimes the term »regime« is used in a deliberate way to delegitimize governments and states that are politically inconvenient.

It is important to note that the international community often concentrates on challenges such as terrorism while the power politics of authoritarian regimes or leaders are tolerated or ignored as long as they provide stability (i.e. no threat to international peace and security).

REGIONAL PATTERNS IN THE DOMESTIC SIDE OF THE STATE MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF FORCE:

In the comparative session, the discussion focused on six predefined aspects/dimensions of the domestic side of the monopoly on the use of force, namely:

- the domestic security challenges in the region/country;
- the separation between the police and the military;
- the role of intelligence services;
- openness towards (regional) cooperation;
- the political role and oversight of the security sector;
- the feasibility of delegation of security provision to regional organizations/external powers

One important aspect mentioned in the debate was that the history of state formation differs between the various regions (and within regions). The first question, about the domestic security challenges in the respective region, was intended merely to set the stage for the comparative overview and reiterated well-known facts. The brief overviews nevertheless highlighted some important tendencies that should be kept in mind when looking at the respective trajectories of the monopoly on the use of force. While every region these days is confronted to some degree with non-traditional and transnational security challenges (like organized crime and terrorism), both major violent internal conflicts and major inter-state conflicts are currently focused on particular regions. A correlation

of all three challenges to the monopoly on the use of force can be found in parts of the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and the wider Sahel region, while maritime conflicts, even strategic rivalries, loom large in East Asia. A decisive factor in the Middle East conflicts is the presence of oil resources, both because of conflicts of interest over access to them and as a means to finance wars and conflicts.

On the aspect of the separation of the police and the military – as different branches of the security sector entrusted with the monopoly on the use of force – it became evident that at least *de jure* this separation has taken root in a range of countries in every region. However, the distinction often remains an artificial one and the division of responsibilities and powers between police and military remains blurred. Interestingly, in most cases the military generally seems to be better endowed with both resources and trust by the population; in some cases the police is merely – either *de jure* or *de facto* – a subordinate »branch« of the military. This frequent political and public preference for the military was discussed in more detail in a subsequent session on militarization. In a previous discussion (at the Berlin conference) the blurring and mixing of responsibilities between the two security actors (the military for external defense and the police for the internal rule of law) had been described as a problematic trend.

In addition to the relationship between the police and the military in general, it was also argued that (at least at the Horn of Africa) there is a tendency to diversify the branches of the security sector, especially in autocratic regimes. Special Forces are created to protect the ruling elite and different branches of the security sector are established to balance and control each other in order to check their political power, too. Yet, in contradistinction to these cases of politicized and militarized security sectors there are also those (arguably few) cases where states cope without any armed forces at all, either because they are not economically sustainable (some of the South Pacific Island States) or because of a deliberate political posture (like in the case of Costa Rica).

The role of the intelligence services also varies significantly from region to region and from state to state. The size of the country is particularly relevant for this branch of the security sector, with some states in the South Pacific, for example, merely having an intelligence unit within the police.

On the issue of openness towards (regional) cooperation in the field of security, a certain ambiguity emerged. On the one hand there is a pragmatic – or one could

say »Realpolitik-driven« – openness towards practical cooperation between security sectors in almost every region (especially when it comes to exchange of intelligence on national security matters post-9/11). This cooperation is pursued either in bilateral formats or in the framework of alliances, with the »five-eyes« being a prominent example of cooperation in the field of intelligence. Cooperation on these issues remains limited to fully-fledged regional organizations, as in the case of the ASEAN, AU, EU and the OAS. And even in such more ambitious cases of institutionalized regional cooperation on internal and domestic security, ambitions and realities diverge significantly, either because of reluctant implementation due to persisting national sovereignty concerns of members states (EU and OAS) or because of a lack of clout and resources (AU and OAS). There was a general consensus that regional security cooperation should figure prominently in the Reflection Group's recommendations.

The political role of the security sector correlates with its oversight by democratic institutions. The regional comparison showed that oversight of the security sector remains a challenge worldwide. While democratic and civilian oversight are in place in large parts of the OECD, at least in theory, the picture is way more heterogeneous in other parts of the world. Especially in autocratic regimes, state security institutions often have broad political room for maneuver and in some cases are even considered to be the real »king-makers«. Recently, it was noted, we seem to be witnessing an increase in »coup d'états« as well as cases of a more gradual seizure of political power by the armed forces. This would again underline the continued relevance of the ambition of security sectors to become political actors themselves rather than being a »professional« and politically neutral state institution. Yet, even in OECD countries oversight often remains problematic, especially for the field of intelligence – as numerous recent scandals illustrate (among others in Germany). Anti-terrorism policies result in mission creep in intelligence agencies and generous resource allocation to them. In the discussion it also became clear that lack of oversight applies not only to state security sectors but also to (legal) private security actors. In the latter, legal regulation and the corresponding state oversight are also problematic.

Lastly, the question of delegation of security provided some particularly interesting insights: Whereas the concept of the monopoly on the use of force presupposes strong sovereignty, there seem to be a variety of cases where states deliberately delegate parts of their (mostly external) security provision to other states, as in the case of some South Pacific Island States, which delegate their security to more powerful

states in the wider region (Australia and New Zealand) or even the United States. This phenomenon, it was argued, can also be seen in a less drastic form in the case of New Zealand and Australia, which themselves delegate parts of their security to the United States.

CORE CONCLUSION FROM THE REGIONAL COMPARATIVE SESSION: THE MORE THE MURKIER?

The proliferation and fragmentation of both state and non-state security actors was the most widely shared takeaway from the discussions in the comparative sessions. Especially in combination with the widespread deficits in civilian and democratic control of the security sector (both state and private security) this trend of fragmentation and proliferation of security actors was identified as a huge challenge for the future of the legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Rather than »the more the merrier« in the field of security provision there is a strong risk that »the more actors, the murkier their impact.« In addition, inclusive provision of security (for all citizens) or a universal right to security seems threatened by the trend of ever-increasing fragmentation of security provision.

DUO INFERNALE: PROLIFERATION OF SECURITY PROVIDERS AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

In addition to the proliferation and fragmentation of security providers/violence actors, another general trend was repeatedly mentioned: the proliferation of the means of violence, predominantly small arms and light weapons. Easy access to such weapons is the result not only of drug trafficking and illegal arms sales by weapons producers from countries with few »moral« restrictions but also of access to state arsenals in countries where state authority has collapsed. Easy access to such basic »force enablers and multipliers« – as the cases of Libya and Iraq have more recently illustrated – can quickly contribute to a wide-scale destabilization of whole regions and empowerment of local security/violence actors. It was left open at the conference whether the Reflection Group should include more empirical, evidence-based research on the »duo infernale.«

CORE STATE FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS TO »PRIVATIZATION« OF SECURITY I – WHAT IS »NATIONAL SECURITY«?

Another intense debate emerged with regard to deliberately initiated processes of privatization of

certain formerly or supposedly sovereign security functions (in the sense of commercialization). The central question here seems to be, to what degree a state can »outsource« certain aspects of security provision to commercial actors and which aspects of security provision should reasonably remain as sovereign state functions. One point repeatedly made in this regard was that issues of national security can usually be assumed to remain firmly in state hands. However, it was stressed that the term »national security« itself is highly contested and controversial and even where issues are clearly highlighted as crucial for national security, this does not in practice necessarily preclude certain specialized tasks and services being outsourced, as can be seen in the employment of contractors in US intelligence and homeland security.

CORE STATE FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS TO »PRIVATIZATION« OF SECURITY II – SHOULD LETHAL FORCE BE UP FOR SALE?

In the course of the discussion the authorization to use lethal force was suggested as a more specific criterion for defining what sort of security functions could be outsourced to commercial security providers. While commercial security providers might indeed represent a helpful option for providing certain security functions at production sites, at public events, and in comparable environments, the argument was that the use of force and firearms (for example) should preferably be reserved for state organs. As this suggestion came out of the blue and a variety of practical reservations with regard to its feasibility emerged, it was agreed that a think piece should explore the potentials and limitations of such very practical and concrete criteria for a reasonable demarcation between exclusively sovereign domains and those where commercial security actors might be a more cost-effective and still legitimate alternative to police forces.

COMMODIFIED SECURITY – PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEMS LOOM LARGE

In the course of the debate a couple of arguments emerged in support of commercial and commodified security provision. The more practical ones underlined that commercial security providers would lift the burden on overstretched police forces and be less costly. More generally it was suggested that the legitimacy of security provision could be enhanced by the very nature of the contract between security client and security provider. This argument was strongly challenged both on empirical and conceptual levels: The US experiences with the use of private military and

security companies, as well as experiences with regard to contracting out certain tasks in other contexts, such as the field of development cooperation, were used to illustrate the practical difficulties in overseeing the security/service provision, which was sometimes not only deficient but also had significantly detrimental political consequences. On the conceptual level, principal-agent dilemmas are widely discussed and on first sight seem to be particularly relevant for the field of security, where the contractor is ultimately in command of the means of violence and the client is not, which implies a weak position in enforcing contracts absent strong public oversight and monopoly on the use of force.

BEYOND INTEREST AND PROFITS – HOW TO TAP THE POTENTIAL OF TRUST AND PRO- FESSIONAL ETHOS FOR GOOD SECURITY GOVERNANCE?

One way to address such principal-agent problems obviously leads beyond political economic considerations towards less tangible factors influencing the performance of (domestic) security actors, like ethos and trust. At various points in the debate it was stressed that a lack of professionalism and professional ethos on the side of state security providers is a crucial factor in flawed security governance. More professional security forces would be better positioned to successfully tackle systematic security risks and at the same time provide a better foundation for increased public trust in security services. A lack of public trust in state security services itself again complicates effective security provision, as people might prefer to turn to other, non-state security actors to safeguard their security needs.

PUBLIC OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABIL- ITY ARE NEEDED FOR BOTH STATE AND PRIVATE SECURITY ACTORS

Against the background of the previous considerations, but also on a more general level, it became very clear that irrespective of the type of actor providing security on the ground, what is particularly sensitive and important is effective public oversight. In the end it was agreed that the legitimacy of security provision depends on the public accountability of the providers. This leads directly to the aspect of oversight institutions, which were repeatedly highlighted as both important but in many cases obviously also quite deficient. Judging from the experiences with Security Sector Reform processes in the past decades, excessive optimism does not seem warranted in this regard. Even for the traditionally sovereign domains of the army and

the police, oversight is often not well-established and lacks both expertise and political clout vis-à-vis the security organs themselves. Oversight over more recent innovations in sovereign security apparatuses (like statutory intelligence agencies, cybersecurity units, and transnational security cooperation), however, is even more precarious and in its infancy, as is oversight over commercial and other private security providers. Ministries and in particular parliaments (in those states where they have political authority at all) face an uphill struggle to provide a decent measure of effective oversight, even in large and mature states with an otherwise functioning democratic system, let alone in small, younger, and underdeveloped countries.

It was also suggested to more clearly differentiate what is meant by oversight, according to the following scheme:

- civilian control of security authorities
- democratic control of security authorities
- civilian control within the framework of democratic governance

ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF FORCE

Against the background of the venue of the conference, Mexico City, the potential and actual challenge to the nation state's monopoly on the use of force by organized crime was the most intensely debated topic throughout the discussions. While organized crime is a severe security problem in many countries in the region, it was nevertheless stressed that organized crime as such is a widespread phenomenon that does not necessarily automatically result in extremely high rates of violence. On the contrary, too much violence is in fact counterproductive for most forms of organized crime, except perhaps for those actors involved primarily in extortion and »protection money.« This, however, in turn implies that low rates of violence do not necessarily indicate a low prevalence of organized crime. Often pragmatic deals or even close cooperation between state authorities and organized crime syndicates keep homicide and violence rates low while the political and economic consequences and influence of organized crime are strong.

RULE OF LAW, CORRUPTION, AND IMPUNITY

Here lies a strategically important nexus: organized crime, a lack of rule of law, corruption, and impunity often go hand in hand. Conversely, it seems that the most important precautions against organized crime

and insecurity are the establishment of rule of law and efforts to prevent corruption and impunity. Political decision-makers from Mexico at the conference strongly emphasized that a need to strengthen the state monopoly on the use of force is a prerequisite for coping with criminal activities, especially the drug trade. Where organized crime is already entrenched, together with a lack of rule of law and high levels of corruption and impunity, however, those precautions are hardly achievable. In such circumstances only few options remain feasible. Two that do were highlighted throughout the discussions. The first, more specific policy option discussed was to deploy more specialized police intelligence to uncover and dislodge sophisticated organized crime networks rather than just targeting »rank and file« criminals involved in drug trafficking and selling. Yet, it was argued that in the end authorities know of most of the organized crime networks quite well, but lack the political will (for various reasons) to pursue their dissolution rigorously. In the end it leads back to the problem of impunity and corruption. The second suggested structural approach for dislodging organized crime focuses on its business model, which is based on the prohibition of certain goods and services. Legalization and regulation of some of the major illegal markets (parts of the illegal drug market) could cut organized crime off from its major sources of revenue. On the other hand, taxation of a regulated drug market could generate the public resources needed to establish rule of law and strengthen legitimate public security authorities.

PROVISION OF SECURITY, INEQUALITY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Another intensely discussed phenomenon of security provision in Latin America is not limited to this part of the world. Wherever public oversight and accountability of state or non-state providers is lacking, security provision seems to become less inclusive. It therefore is plausible to assume that it has direct relevance for the degree of social inequality and justice in a society. Wherever security is not provided as a public good – another definition would go – the degree of security is directly linked to the ability to pay or arrange for it privately. In direct relation to this consideration, a strong argument was made to advocate for a »universal right to security,« something which has supposedly already been under discussion at the UN but failed to gain sufficient traction. Whereas such a rights-based approach to security would supposedly require a new official negotiation process, it was pointed out that the recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals already provide an internationally agreed agenda and framework containing elements of a rights-based approach to security under its goal 16. It was agreed

that this aspect should form part of the agenda of the spring 2016 conference in New York.

DIMENSIONS AND DYNAMICS OF MILITARIZATION

In the discussions two main trends of militarization were described. The first alluded to the use of the armed forces for matters of domestic security (and relates to the above-mentioned blurring of lines between various security providers), the second to the armed forces seizing important civilian roles and functions. A variety of factors were identified that facilitate such trends: First, it was argued that in the case of Latin America there are few border tensions that necessitate a strong military presence. Accordingly, armed forces and political decision-makers might consider how to make other use of such an expensive tool as the armed forces. In Latin America there currently seem to be two major potential deployment patterns for the military: Deployment to Peace Operations or deployment for internal purposes. Where there are no strong curbs on involvement of the military in domestic affairs – such as in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay due to the historic legacies of dictatorial military regimes – there is a risk of it deliberately becoming involved in domestic security provision. While it was argued earlier that ruling out such a domestic role for the armed forces tends to be the exception rather than the rule in comparative international perspective, there are nevertheless profound reasons to be skeptical towards such role. First and foremost, the military is usually not well trained to perform tasks in the field of domestic security. Their weaponry, doctrines and training risk an escalation of violence and severe human rights violations rather than guaranteeing the rule of law.

THE MILITARY AS MODERNIZERS – A FORTHOTTEN CONCEPTUAL LEGACY?

When discussing the role of the military and the heterogeneous trends of militarization, as exemplified in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, an important factor was highlighted in the debate: In the early days of development policy there was a strong current of arguments that identified the »military as potential change agents for modernization.« This concept was a crucial factor in a general environment that envisaged a strong role for the military – not only in Latin America but also in other parts of the world – as agents of modernization on the one hand and (in the Cold War) as guardians against communism on the other. Despite dire experiences with military coups, this conceptual and political heritage shaped historical

trajectories and underlies current developments accordingly, even if there are hardly any open supporters of »military as modernizer« approaches left today. Today's ignorance of this conceptual legacy and the historicity of concepts is not only problematic when it comes to the role of the military, as will be seen below (intelligence)

THE DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY AND POLICE

In addition to the problematic political implications of the earlier »military as modernizers« understanding, the concept might also have contributed to the already often quite sensitive relationship between the military and the police in certain countries. It was repeatedly noted in the discussions that public trust in and respect for the military is in many cases significantly higher than for the police. This is sometimes reflected in a sort of informal or even formal hierarchy that sees the police as a subordinate entity to the military. When looking for potential counter-examples, those that came to the fore were countries like Costa Rica that do not have a military at all and few others like Nicaragua.

MILITIAS EMPLOYED BY THE STATE

Against the background of the regional dynamics in Latin America a discussion that was already partially highlighted in the Spring Conference and in one of the think pieces reemerged in the group: the problem that some states actively support or even establish militias outside their own statutory provisions. This serves the purpose of being able to counter competing security actors within their own territory without being bound by the restrictions that apply to their own statutory forces. Furthermore it allows a degree of formal – if mostly not highly plausible – deniability to state elites when such militias perpetrate atrocities.

INTELLIGENCE – RECENT PHENOMENON; OVERSIGHT AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK RUDIMENTARY AT BEST!

One of the most remarkable insights from the discussions in Mexico, finally, pertains to the role of the intelligence services: The fact that statutory intelligence agencies, and even more so their oversight institutions, are a comparatively recent phenomenon does not seem to be widely acknowledged. It was stressed that formal intelligence services only emerged as a standard feature of modern security apparatuses after the Second World War, with civilian (democratic) oversight only emerging since the 1970s. *This again*

points to a bias in our standard conceptualizations of security institutions and the monopoly on the use of force in general: We tend to discount the historicity of these institutions associated with the monopoly on the use of force and act as if these institutional templates are a given. This is not only false with regard to those areas of limited statehood discussed previously, it also ignores the fact that for most of history these institutions either looked very different and had very different roles to play (see for example the division between police for internal and the armed forces for external security) or did not exist as formal and legal entities at all (intelligence services).

In the discussion it was also stressed that the nature and function of intelligence services are highly political, their being tasked with providing information for political decision-makers. Whether they serve regime security rather than human security predominantly depends on the political actors. (This notwithstanding, the regional comparison showed that in some regions there are indeed tendencies where the elites of the intelligence agencies play strong political roles themselves, too.) Oversight in the case of intelligence services, furthermore, is not only a comparatively recent concern, it also faces particular challenges: The amount of information increases with increasing resources for intelligence agencies and technological progress, which clearly seem to outpace the emergence of adequate oversight mechanisms.

OUTLOOK: FEASIBLE ALLIANCES FOR RULE OF LAW AND MORE LEGITIMATE MONOPOLIES ON THE USE OF FORCE?

Coming from the analysis of problems, a variety of potential rather specific policy implications are already highlighted above (a list with both findings and tentative implications/policy recommendations will be shared with the group in the run-up to the New York Conference). On a more abstract level, the discussion repeatedly emphasized the necessity to identify potential change agents and alliances of actors who might join forces to establish the rule of law and a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. A subsequent workshop hosted by FES Mexico office – and which involved parts of the reflection group, too – took up this question and discussed it further. The respective Workshop Report comes up with the following main conclusions in this regard:

REFLECTION GROUP MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF FORCE

The Reflection Group »Monopoly on the use of force 2.0?« is a global dialogue initiative to raise awareness and discuss policy options for the concept of the monopoly for the use of force. Far from being a merely academic concern, this concept, at least theoretically and legally remains at the heart of the current international security order. However it is faced with a variety of grave challenges and hardly seems to reflect realities on the ground in various regions around the globe anymore. For more information about the work of the reflection group and its members please visit: http://www.fes.de/GPol/en/security_policy.htm

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