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Andreas Wittkowsky
Kosovo – a Model?
UNMIK and the Architecture of Future International Mandates
Jochen Müller
The Islamic Argument
Why So Many Arabs Feel Surrounded by Enemies
Michael Dauderstädt
The Need to Adjust and
the Loss of Legitimation: the European Dilemma
Arne Heise
The Cologne Process: a Neglected Aspect of European Employment Policy
Hans Platzer
Europeanization and Transnationalization of Labor Relations in the EU
Rebecca Harding
Dynamic Germany. The Role of Policy in Enabling
Markets
Hanns W.Maull
Containing Entropy, Rebuilding the State: Challenges to International
Order in the Age of Globalization
A
policy on international order requires a consistent concept of how
this order should be structured. On the one hand, the concept must
be oriented towards the dominant Western values of democracy and the
global market economy; on the other, it must also find acceptance
outside the Western world. These requirements might be fulfilled by
a vision of international order which aims at a systematic civilizing
of conflict management and at the rule of law for international relations.
This implies a model of an order in which the differences between
democratic domestic policy and world order policy are gradually reduced
and ultimately removed. The realization of such a concept is currently,
and for the foreseeable future, endangered more by the inability of
world order politics to guide developments and by the immanent dynamism
of globalization processes than by opponents with differing concepts
of world order. The risks deriving from Islamic fundamentalism are
ultimately only the consequences of an overarching tendency towards
political entropy. In order to overcome the problems, international
order policy needs to start from efficient states. The modern, democratic
nation state has generally managed to civilize conflict management
within its own borders, but many non-Western countries have incomplete
or no institutions of modern statehood. The international community
is called on here to intervene and build up statehood. At the same
time, the nation state in the West is also coming under pressure from
processes of globalization: it can only regain lost control of events
via intergovernmental and supranational cooperation. In the construction
of a world order fit to tackle the problems, cooperation between the
USA and the European Union plays a key role. For the time being, profound
American reservations about the very concept of such an order and
the EU's underdeveloped capability of policy and strategy block the
realization of this vision.
Andreas Wittkowsky
Kosovo – a Model?
UNMIK and the Architecture of Future International Mandates
The international public is again taking an interest in the possibilities
to intervene in regions which are affected by lasting conflicts
and the disintegration of state structures. The UN interim administration
in Kosovo (UNMIK) is regarded as a possible model. UNMIK can indeed
point to an impressive record of success and has created opportunities
for peaceful conflict management (which now need to be utilized
by the local political forces). UNMIK was particularly successful
where specific supplies and services were needed quickly (e.g. emergency
aid) or where international experts could assume responsibility
for administrative action without much difficulty. It comes as little
surprise that there are greater problems in the establishment of
those institutions which rely on changed attitudes and a basic acceptance
by society. Even in the most positive case, these can only be anchored
over the longer term. Also, important sections of society are resisting
some of these institutions. Particular problems are resulting from
the fact that the future status of Kosovo under international law
is being deliberately kept open. The central political problem is
the longer-term acceptance of the mandate by the Kosovars and the
implementation of corresponding policies. Doubts about whether this
model can simply be repeated elsewhere derive from the insight that
the success story so far is based on several fortunate environmental
factors. These include in particular the presence of the security
agencies throughout the territory, close economic, family and cultural
contacts between the Kosovars and the European Union, a high degree
of individual initiative and – due to the Kosovar social structure
– a considerable level of internal stability. Future international
mandates must take a robust but realistic approach. The robustness
can derive from a linking of civilian and military intelligence
and police functions, an early establishment of international judicial
authorities and strong political public relations work. High priority
must be given to the handling of disputatious property issues, which
may be a major reason for continuing conflicts. One way to make
the construction of the mandate realistic may be to hand political
responsibility to the local elites at an early stage in order to
create corresponding “ownership”. However, the resolution of the
central social challenge – to build a modern nation and to legitimize
state powers – cannot come from outside.
Jochen
Müller
The Islamic Argument
Why So Many Arabs Feel Surrounded by Enemies
In the attempts to explain the attacks of 11 September, one approach
was based on a still “unenlightened” Islam, whilst others tried to
regard the Islamicist terror as a consequence of globalization. However,
neither of these perspectives took much account of the history and
current situation of the various strands of political Islam. Yet a
glance at the recent past shows how, even back in the 19th century,
an Islamic debate emerged in the Middle East as a response to colonialism
and subjection. Even today, the assertion that there is an ongoing
threat to and humiliation of “Moslems” by “the West” is a major driving
force behind a collective Islamic identity in many countries in the
region. This widespread sense of an outside threat is utilized both
by the authoritarian regimes in the region and by the various strands
of political Islam: they promote conspiracy theories like anti-Semitism
and detract attention from any emancipatory criticism of the social
contradictions in their societies. In contrast to moderate “mainstream
Islamicism”, which adapts itself to the political systems in the region,
e.g. in the form of the Moslem Brotherhood, the groupings of radical
Islam justify their militant struggle with appeals to the “colonial
legacy”, a concept rooted deep in the collective consciousness. They
claim to be defenders of the Moslem collective. They see their ideology
confirmed in the war of the anti-terror alliance against the Taliban
and in other Western interventionist plans. However, the terror of
the radicals has so far been directed almost exclusively against their
own national regimes, which they brand “unIslamic”. Radical Islam
has been greatly weakened at this national level in recent years.
Jihad Islam, which operates internationally – represented mainly by
Al Qaida – is a special case in the spectrum of radical Islam.
Michael Dauderstädt
The Need to Adjust and the Loss of Legitimation:
the European Dilemma
The EU is simultaneously deepening and enlarging. The measures to deepen
the Union, in the form of market liberalization and policy harmonization,
have continually leveled the playing field in Europe on which people,
companies, regions and countries fight for their opportunities to gain
prosperity. This changes the nature of the conflicts over distribution
of wealth and of the processes of adjustment, which assume a European
as well as a national aspect. On top of this, there is the enlargement
of the Union, which is bringing clearly more heterogeneous, but particularly
poorer players onto the leveled playing field. Their interest in growing
their economies to catch up with the richer members is at risk of being
frustrated due to an inefficient regional policy and a stability-fixated
monetary policy. The competition from the numerous poorer regions is
encountering welfare societies whose own regimes are already being subjected
to massive pressures to adjust (demography, globalization) for various
reasons. There is a risk of increasing unemployment and inequality,
and this often means that national governments are unable to implement
the necessary painful reforms. Instead, they tend to shift the blame
onto Brussels. The adjustment of the (national) distribution of opportunities
for income and wealth is always a highly political process – especially
in the European democracies. If traditional patterns of adjustment become
ineffective or unacceptable, the result is always an exacerbation of
domestic and international conflicts over distribution of wealth, and
calls for new national strategies conducive to integration or for better
supranational policies. Whilst the European “supra-state”, with its
inadequate democratic legitimation, changes the conditions of national
policy-making, the latter’s less socially acceptable results undermine
the legitimacy of European integration and possibly even of (national)
democracy. More subsidiarity, differentiation and flexibility of integration,
as well as the democratization of the institutions of the Union, could
open up European policy-making more for the relevant interests in society
and thus help it to be handled in a socially acceptable manner. But
the principle of the Common Market places restrictions on the independence
which the EU can grant to the national governments to influence their
national economies.
Arne
Heise
The Cologne Process: a Neglected Aspect of European Employment Policy
Since the Amsterdam revision of the Maastricht Treaty, the European
Union has accepted its responsibility for the development of employment.
A three-pillar concept for European employment policy was then elaborated
at various EU summits, focusing on labor-market policy (Luxembourg
Process), goods market and financial market reform (Cardiff Process)
and co-ordination of the macroeconomic fields of monetary, fiscal
and wage policy (Cologne Process). Virtually unnoticed by the academic
world and the public, a process was set in motion at the Cologne EU
summit in 1999 that aims to provide a policy mix which favors economic
growth – and thus employment. This is rooted in the understanding
that the European Central Bank, the Ecofin council and the social
partners need to co-ordinate their actions in order to create a market
situation within which the European employment problems can be solved.
However, it quickly became clear that this understanding was not able
to engender any lasting efforts to co-operate. It would seem that
the Cologne Process was born out of a situation in which, following
the election of Chancellor Schröder and Finance Minister Lafontaine,
EU policy was taking a different direction for a brief period. The
general ineffectiveness of the EU macroeconomic dialogue is due (a)
to its systematic incompatibility with the other policy processes
of European economic policy, and particularly the Stability and Growth
Pact, (b) to the lack of an institutional anchor for co-operation,
and (c) to the opportunism of politicians who do not wish to take
a stand against the economic policy zeitgeist.
Hans
Platzer
Europeanization and Transnationalization of Labor Relations in the
EU
Since the mid-1990s, new supranational structures of labor relations
have been forming in the EU as a result of changes in the EU regulatory
system in the field of labor and social policy. The European trade unions
and employers’ associations now have the option of independent collective
negotiations at European level. Also, they can reach agreements on social
and labor issues in certain areas which then become part of EU social
legislation by virtue of a decision by the Council of Ministers. In
several respects, the European works councils are by far the most dynamic
element of the Europeanization of labor relations. The directive of
September 1994 regarding their establishment created an institution
of collective labor law at European level for the first time. Because
it is not a binding “model”, it forces managements and employees’ representatives,
employers’ associations and trade unions, to work through this “project”
themselves. This places fresh demands on communication, co-ordination
of actions and the preparation of negotiations by the players involved.
The question of whether the European Works Councils will come to form
the germ of a transnational trade unionism embracing an entire company
group remains open. With regard to the hard core of labor relations,
i.e. the collective negotiations on wages, working hours, etc., effective
Europeanization is impeded both by the trade unions’ lack of organizational
resources and by the employers’ lack of interest. The latter have no
interest in pan-European agreements which restrict competition between
the national labor forces – competition which is particularly effective
against the background of high unemployment in large parts of the EU.
And the unions themselves are prevented from forming pan-European combat
fronts by their involvement in national “modernization pacts”. Also,
the EU has not established a European set of rules for collective bargaining.
The institution of the “social dialogue” has remained correspondingly
“toothless”.
Rebecca Harding
Dynamic Germany. The Role of Policy in Enabling Markets
Modell Deutschland has drawn much criticism in recent years. It has been roundly condemned as, at best, top heavy and inflexible
and, at worst, defunct in an economic era characterised by dynamic,
market-based operations and radical innovation. It is inflexibility, especially in labour markets, that has damned
Germany in the eyes of “Anglo-Saxon” policy makers during the 1990s
and into the 21st century. However,
there is evidence to suggest that prophecies of doom are somewhat premature,
particularly in some of the fast growing technological areas that generate
science-based entrepreneurship. In
order to understand the processes that are at work, commentators and
analysts should look at the inter-relationship between policy and institutional
adaptiveness that creates sustainable change in the innovation system. The complex set of connections between the
various institutions of the German system are enabled through policy.
Competitiveness stems from the capacity of enabling policy to stimulate
effective institutional adaptation and create mechanisms to facilitate
and widen participation in key markets (such as that for science-based
entrepreneurship). Government intervention is key in creating bridges
between individuals and the market as the need arises.
Policy makers have built up an institutional culture of competition
and collaboration in the system which creates a very real market-based
dynamism alongside a networked structure that is key in maximising the
innovative potential of an economy. At the beginning of the 21st Century,
the institutional structures of the innovation system are actually driving
the economy towards higher innovation-based productivity and entrepreneurially
led growth.
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