Summaries:
Stefan Mair
The New World of Privatized Violence
Stephen Ellis
The Old Roots of Africa's "New" Wars
William
Reno
Political Networks in a Failing Stage
The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone
David Keen
Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths
The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone
Stefan Mair
The New World
of Privatized Violence
In retrospect, the 1990s might not have marked the end of
history but the replacement of states as aggressors and main
threat to international security by non-state, private actors
of violence. September 11 did not trigger off this development
but was its preliminary zenith. Bedeviled by the terrorist
threat, decision-makers tend either to neglect other forms
of privatized violence or to subsume them under terrorism.
This does not only misjudge warlords, rebels and organized
crime, it makes their containment more difficult. The four
ideal types of privatized violence – the three just named
plus terrorists – show marked differences in terms of objectives,
target groups, and the geographic scope of the use of violence
as well as in the relation to the state monopoly on the use
of force. They, however, co-operate in different ways and
on different levels. The synergies they develop among each
other as well as the links they foster with some states, parts
of the private sector and even NGOs create an amalgam which
will require international attention beyond the campaign against
terrorism. Sub-Saharan Africa is the region in which three
components of this amalgam are more interlocked than in any
other: warlordism, rebellion and organized crime. It is the
absence of a genuinely African terrorism which tempts security
experts to neglect the region nevertheless. The hope remains
that the price of this neglect will not exceed all risk calculations.
Stephen Ellis
The Old Roots of Africa’s New Wars
Quite a few of Africa’s civil wars, which have drawn such
attention recently, date back to the period before the end
of the Cold War. Nevertheless, an increase in the number of
violent conflicts can be observed since 1990. The common roots
of the older and of the new African wars lie in the political
system of post-colonial states. From the beginning politics
was stamped with clientism and oriented towards getting a
share of the resources controlled by the state. Individual
groups sought to obtain these sinecures and to exclude their
rivals. That is, clientistic politics obeys the logic of a
zero-sum game or, to put it another way, the logic of war.
It was always a “militarized” politics. At the beginning,
African regimes had sufficient means at their disposal to
maintain an effective system of patronage. That was not least
due to the financial support which they received from the
great powers associated with them in the context of the Cold
War. These governments also usually had sufficient means to
keep in check violent insurrections. With the end of the Cold
War the inflow of resources to a large extent dried up. Economic
decline, often coupled with bad (both home-made as well as
internationally imposed) policies, went one step further,
reducing the controlling power of the government as well as
causing dissatisfaction to grow, and intensifying the struggle
for wealth within the framework of the clientistic political
model. An important role was also played by the expectations,
unrealistic over the long term, formed during the extraordinary
period of global prosperity of the first post-colonial decades.
Post-colonial Africa was oriented towards a modern Western
economic and social model which proved unsustainable. In the
struggle for ever scarcer sources of wealth the activation
of ethnic feelings of affiliation became a proven and obvious
means of mobilization. This has nothing to do with a relapse
into pre-national forms of social organization in the sense
of a collapse of national societies. Rather the activation
of ethnic identity serves the struggle for power in the multi-ethnic
state or for the resources controlled by it. Violent politics,
once the transition to it has been made, creates its own,
self-reinforcing dynamic. It must remain an open question
whether the current period of violence-based political conflict,
with its immensely high costs is preparing the ground for
a more peaceful way of organizing society – as it has once
done in Europe.
William Reno
Political Networks in a Failing State
The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone
It is widely recognized that in the context of state collapse
and conflict, armed groups have a tendency to fight for control
over available natural resources.
This contributes to a “greed over grievance” explanation
for the course of long-running wars that result in dramatic
human rights violations.
Yet closer examination of Sierra Leone’s 1991-2002
war reveals significant variation in patterns of fighting.
In some locales, armed youth joined home guard units. Elsewhere they had a greater tendency to join Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) rebels. The
former protected communities as they mined diamonds while
the latter preyed upon even their home communities and allied
with rebels in the same pursuit. The explanation for this variation is found
in the social structures of local communities.
This explanation relies upon a focus on the period
of state collapse that preceded armed conflict.
It finds that home guard units formed in locales where
pre-war strongmen could not ally with the authoritarian regime
in the capital. Regarded
as politically unreliable, rulers marginalized them from clandestine,
predatory economic networks that the patronage-based regime
relied upon to rule. This
forced these strongmen to rely upon closer ties to local illicit
miners for protection from violent intervention from the capital.
In contrast, politically favored strongmen found that
they could dispense with alliances with local mining gangs,
trading them for more lucrative deals with politicians in
the capital. Ironically, those strongmen and local leaders who may have thought
themselves disadvantaged before the war quickly discovered
that they were in a far better position to weather the conflict
as they translated their social control over armed youth to
organize home guard units. This analysis shows that restoring state control
may not be the optimal means for conflict management, especially
if this allows corrupt politicians in the capital to repeat
the experience of the pre-war politics.
David Keen
Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths
The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone
The 11-year civil war in Sierra Leone which displaced more
than half the population constitutes an escalation process
of growing complexity. Diamond mining has played a major role
in this. The various factions increasingly fought for control
over diamond mines as a source of personal enrichment. Diamond
mining was, however, also the most important means of financing
the war. In addition, mining rights were a central issue of
distributive justice and hence of the regime’s legitimacy.
But the diamond economy alone cannot explain the spiral of
violence in Sierra Leone. Also important is the general dissatisfaction
with the economic situation, the dismal prospects for the
individual, themselves the result of the national pattern
of development. In particular, large parts of the younger
generation are deeply frustrated. Moreover, the system of
government has lost legitimacy due to both the manifest inability
of successive governments to prevent general economic deterioration,
and massive injustices for which they were held responsible.
President Siaka Stevens (1971–85) in particular made the consolidation of his power
and his own enrichment the manifest aim of his government.
Disadvantaged groups became increasingly disgruntled, and
state involvement in public affairs degenerated into an instrument
for the benefit of officials and their clients. In due course,
this “privatized” form of state power was opposed by rebels
(supported by Liberia). Against the background of the state’s
general lack of legitimacy and power (dwindling resources!)
the civil war, once it had begun, became a context which provided
a structure for manifold social conflicts. Rebels and soldiers
alike sought opportunities for predation (diamonds just as
much as looting). The quest for prey, however, was also overlaid
with criteria related to “justice”, which among other things
led to rifts within the ranks of the armed forces, but also
to a generalized confrontation between soldiers and civilians.
After the conclusion of peace the danger is that the structures
which led to the escalation of violence in the first place
will once more become established. The externally imposed
neo-liberal economic policy provides – against its own credo
– certain privileged manipulators with immense opportunities
to enrich themselves, while for the mass of the population
it is becoming associated with the frustrating prospect of
continuing austerity. The structures of the diamond economy,
with the attendant corruption, remain in place. The demobilization
of the armed groups, as a result of the limited possibilities
for reintegration, is giving rise to new discontents. Only
long-term external intervention, combined with large-scale
financial support, appears to offer a lasting solution.
Daniel Stroux
Resources,
Resentments, and State-Free Regions
The Structures of War in the Center of Africa
The core of the conflict in Central Africa is constituted
by the power struggles which have gone on for decades between
Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, and which in the
1990s climaxed in the Rwandan genocide of over one million
people. The fact that this (region-wide) conflict could
develop into an African war involving seven nation-states
has to do with the simultaneous collapse of resource-rich
Zaire, today the Democratic Republic of Congo. When the
Mobutu regime could no longer control the access of foreign
investors to the rich raw material deposits (precious metals,
uranium, copper, oil, gas) the country became a self-service
store for neighboring states. First it was Rwandan and Ugandan
troops who in eastern Congo – always an area into which
the losers in power struggles in neighboring countries could
withdraw and find long-term refuge – fought their domestic
enemies outside the borders of their countries. This power-politics-based
invasion increasingly became overlaid by economic motives,
which, in turn, caused Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia to
support the Congo in order to secure a share of the raw
materials for themselves. With the Lusaka Agreement in 1999
and the death of Laurent Kabila in January 2001 the path
to peace was pursued. Not only in the Congo but also in
Rwanda and Burundi with the participation of the United
Nations attempts were made to include the different ethnic
groups in society and political life. These attempts face
formidable challenges, however. Politicians who come to
power dedicate themselves to excluding their opponents,
usually with considerable assiduity. Resort to violence
is therefore the rule, dialogue the exception. If politicians
can to some extent still be controlled by means of international
sanctions the same cannot be said of the numerous warlords.
Not only the raw materials, but also the resentments and
traumas of a large part of the population, which are the
result of long and brutal wars, are almost a guarantee that
the use of violence will form an important part of political
conflicts also in the future.
Gilles Dorronsoro
Afghanistan: The Delusions of Victory
The success of the US military intervention in Afghanistan
was at first convincing, but the construction of a peaceful
and economically viable community has so far failed. The Karzai
government is weak. Outside the capital Kabul it is not accepted,
and in the provinces the warlords have once more assumed power.
A national project which includes all ethnic groups and their
socio-economic interests has so far not been developed. There
is a general power vacuum in which different guerilla groups
have been able to expand: alongside the neo-Taliban, the Arab
fighters who remained in the country (or who have returned)
and the groups around the Hezb-i Islami. All groups have at
their disposal territories into which they can withdraw beyond
reach. The cultivation of opium is flourishing and serves
as a source of revenue for the guerilla groups, with which
they can further increase their already copious arsenals.
The original alliance between the USA and Pakistan is fragile:
above all in the Afghan–Pakistani border region anti-American,
fundamentalist groups have come to power. As a result the
USA has been forced to engage to a greater extent than planned,
both militarily and in terms of humanitarian aid, in order
to pursue the so far unattained goals of intervention. Everything
points towards a longer-term US presence in Afghanistan. Whether
or not this serves the security of the USA as regards international
terrorism cannot at present be conclusively determined, but
the negative consequences for the international reputation
of the USA and its military capabilities are predictable.
Michael Ehrke
Bosnia: Predators Turned into Rent-Seekers
Mafia, Bureaucracy, and International Mandate in Bosnia
After the civil war the international community has applied
itself to putting Bosnia-Herzegovina on the road to becoming
a democratically organized state with a prosperous (market)
economy. It assumed state authority there in order to take and
implement the basic structure-forming decisions. Paradoxically,
however, this external intervention is strengthening structures
in Bosnian society which impede democratic and economic development.
The provisional de-facto government of the Office of the High
Representative came up against a reality formed by the “predator-economy”
which emerged during the civil war. Mafia power structures had
developed which controlled opportunities not just for enrichment
but also for economic survival. In the war these opportunities
consisted of (a) robbery and plunder, and (b) the exploitation
of the high degree of market segmentation which in turn was
a result of war-related breakdowns in transportation and arbitrarily
established trade barriers.
Production became insignificant as a source of income.
For the population it was a matter of economic survival to become
part of the networks established by the “entrepreneurs of violence”.
Naturally, ethnic affiliation became the most important criterion
for joining one network or another. Thus, the return to pre-modern
“tribal” structures can be seen as the political pendant of
the “predator-economy” produced by the breakdown of the Yugoslavian
state. The UN intervention force brought the predator-economy
to an end, but its networks remained in existence. They adapted
to the changed situation in that they (a) used the circumvention
of market-segmenting, price-increasing regulations (above all
in the form of inner borders) for making money, and (b) brought
under their control the new sources of rent connected to the
economic aid flowing in from outside. Excluding competitors
is crucial to this sort of rent-seeking. The mafia elites therefore
have an interest in the maintenance of the structures of non-transparency,
ethnic isolation, and the associated clientelist networks. Modernization
and development, which the international community is striving
to achieve, are not what they have in mind at all. The threat
and use of violence are just as much component parts of the
rent-seeking economy as the penetration of official administrative
structures. The protectorate government for its part is dependent
on local elites (local government, and so on). Only in this
way can it rapidly reach the population and, thus, please public
opinion abroad on which the international mandate and its finances
depend. Given the extremely meager opportunities for finding
formal employment, the population remains dependent on cooperation
with the “mafia”, as it was during the civil war. Thus, the
strengthening of ethnic particularism corresponds to the logic
of economic survival in peace time as well. Therefore, people
also vote overwhelmingly on an ethnic basis, which is diametrically
opposed to the intentions of the protectorate government. Democracy
will be impossible as long as it does not point the way to reconciliation,
but rather exacerbates existing cleavages. If the protectorate
government wants to realize its mission it must make a sustained
effort to breach the structures of the mafia-controlled rent-seeking
economy, which for its part impedes productive development.
Since Bosnia belongs to the expansion area of the EU it may
be expected that the immense resources needed to do this will
eventually be made available.
Winfried Veit
A European Future
for Israel
Key to the Solution of the Middle East Conflict
The vision proclaimed by Nobel-Peace-Prize winner Shimon Peres
of a “new Middle East” now appears to the majority of Israelis
(but also to Palestinians and Arabs) to be barely credible;
but even in the case of a possible peace solution Israel would
still be, for structural reasons which lie in its completely
different economic and social development, a “foreign body”
in the Middle East. The close relationship with the USA, strengthened
above all by the events of 11 September 2001 and resting on
common security interests, offers Israel no real future because
in the long term the interests of the global power of America
might turn in another direction. On the other hand, Israel is
already linked to Europe in many ways, even if at the moment
critical, even hostile feelings towards the other dominate on
both sides. Nevertheless, a European future for Israel, even to the extent of full
membership of the European Union, is imaginable and desirable,
not only from the Israeli standpoint, but also as a possible
key to the solution of the conflict in the Middle East: as part
of Europe Israel would be in a secure position which would allow
it to make the concessions to the Palestinians (and Syrians)
which are necessary for a peaceful solution of the conflict.
The domestic political and social obstacles to this (human rights
issues, the religious Jewish nature of the state) appear not
insuperable, particularly because a European future is already
the subject of vigorous public debate, and proposals for a solution
are on the table. With
Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004 and possible entry negotiations
with Turkey the geographical argument against Israeli entry
to the EU is no longer valid. Economically and socially it would
be easier to integrate Israel in the EU than the majority of
candidate countries.
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