Summary — Issue 01 / 2004 Anne-Marie Le Gloannec: The Unilateralist Temptation: Germany’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War
		Continuity or change? This has been a major question structuring the debate on German foreign policy since unification, in particular with regard to Germany’s traditional multilateralist orientation. Germany’s embeddedness in multilateral institutions was not only an obligation, but it also has furthered German interests and over time has become internalized as a key aspect of German self-understanding. This orientation has remained part of German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: participation in military operations, for example, has run in parallel with diplomatic initiatives for multilateral, peaceful solutions. Nonetheless, multilateralism under both the Kohl and the Schröder governments has come under fire. The staunch refusal to take part in the US-led war against Iraq was only one of many unilateralist steps which have affronted Germany’s partners. Reduced resources is one important factor in understanding this shift: Germany has changed from EU economic motor to liability, exercising a “hegemony of weakness”. The German government has lost the means and willingness to promote European interests over narrower national or sectoral ones. Second, the number and heterogeneity of the German Länder have increased since reunification and their power has grown. This has made possible a territorialization of politics which is not conducive to Europeanization and globalization. Finally, public opinion polls, while reflecting a growing level of Europeanization as regards German identity, suggest growing opposition to the further transfer of competences to the European level. However, German unilateral tendencies are linked to trends in international and European multilateral structures. Changes in the pattern of multilateralism are most obvious in the European Union. In the latest rounds of enlargement, the rules of the game have been altered. Negotiations are increasingly characterized by free-floating coalitions, “multi-bilateralism”, an orientation towards short-term gains, and loose commitments. Franco-German cooperation also reflects these changes. It is suffering from disinvestment on both sides. A return of the old partnership is rather unlikely, since many Germans consider the relationship unbalanced. Furthermore, the historical legitimacy of the Franco-German axis in the EU leadership is called into question by the accession of new EU members with different historical backgrounds, whereas legitimacy based on efficiency has been undermined by the economic weakness of both countries. Given the effects of the recent unilateralist diplomacy of the German government, but also structural shifts in Europe and US unilateralism, Germany will no longer be able to play its former role as bridge and intermediary, neither within Europe nor across the Atlantic. If Germany proves its continuing ability to shape European politics, however, it may regain the position of privileged interlocutor.
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