For some years now a growing number of intergovernmental grouping have formed both within and parallel to the multilateral institutions. This proliferation of intergovernmental arrangements entails a real risk that it may contain the seeds that will ultimately cause the ongoing, overarching dialogue on global issues to unravel.

At present this tendency toward fragmentation of the multilateral system is most clearly visible in the world trade regime. The course of the »Doha Round« has led to an accentuation of conflicts of interest between the industrialized countries and the developing and emerging nations. With a view to strengthening their bargaining positions, the countries of the South have formed a number of alliances and groupings (G20, G33, G90, etc.). Despite prophecies to the contrary, these new alliances have not proven to be a temporary phenomenon; indeed, they have led to a permanent change in the balance of power of the world trade regime. The dominance of the industrialized countries has given way to a growingly differentiated landscape of interests that rules out any one-sided dictates of the developed countries at the expense of the developing countries. This may be seen as a reflection of a »new trade geography« in which a number of emerging economies have made up considerable ground vis-à-vis the dominant industrialized nations. One way in which the new groupings differ from earlier attempts on the part of the countries of the South to form broad fronts defining their positions is that they are now seeking a pragmatic orientation and a coordination of interests within the logic of the liberal trade regime. Still, these new groupings have increased the complexity of the negotiating processes, making it more difficult to reach trade agreements in the future.

Processes leading to the formation of discussion forums and informal coordination procedures may also be observed in the bodies created to manage the world economy. Here the impulses leading to the formation of new groups are for the most part provided by the economically powerful nations. Paradigmatic for this tendency is the G8, an informal forum bringing together the world’s leading industrialized nations, and one that claims a global leadership role for itself. The ongoing shift in the balance of economic power between successful industrialized countries and rising countries from the South has opened up a legitimacy and efficiency gap between the G8’s exclusive membership and the leadership role it has assigned to itself. Any persistent attempts to exclude the new powers of the 21st century would reduce the G8 to the status of an outdated summit forum neither capable nor legitimized to exercise leadership. The responses to this development include the formation of complementary, more inclusive forums like the G20, whose membership also includes some emerging nations that must be seen as important in »systemic« terms and discussions revolving around an expansion of or replacement for the G8.

This increase in the formation of new groups points to a number of profound changes in the international system that are bound up with efficiency problems and a dramatic loss of legitimacy. If nothing is done to correct the power asymmetries inherent in the international system, the present system will prove to be obsolete and incapable of rising to meet the new global challenges. These newly formed alliances and groupings are a sign of resistance to the continuing dominance of the industrialized countries in global politics and at the same time a growing call to the new powers of the South to engage in more active policies in efforts to come to effective grips with global problems. Even though this may increase the complexity of multilateral negotiating processes, the new alliances and groupings should not be seen as a sign of any erosion of universal multilateralism. Indeed, they tend more to reinforce the latter’s universal character in that they
give voice to interests and positions that have until now been excluded.