In May 2006 the European Union and Russia agreed to enter into negotiations on a new treaty pact set to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which is set to expire at the end of 2007. The new comprehensive agreement is expected to put the »strategic partnership« between the two parties on a new and firm basis. Negotiations, however, have not yet started, since the Polish government insisted on the prior lifting of a Russian ban on meat exports from Poland.

The Polish reservations are not only part of familiar linkage politics of individual EU members, they rather reflect a deep-seated mistrust on a larger part of the EU membership. In its turn, Russia too has expressed quite some uneasiness with what it considers an asymmetrical relationship. Thus the current PCA calls for a harmonization of norms along the lines of the acquis communautaire. In the official Russian view, enhancing the relationship therefore entails recognizing Russia as an equal partner and refraining from any future lecturing.

Apart from these general sentiments, there are two major stumbling blocks which may turn negotiations, once started, into a protracted process. One concerns the growing values gap between the European Union and Russia and the controversy in the West as to whether (diverging) values or (converging) interests should take precedence. Questioning the wisdom of strategic partnership on principle grounds, proponents of democratic values maintain that these are of crucial importance and a necessary condition for a lasting relationship. Others, however, point to the large array of common interests and express confidence that in the course of an interest-based cooperation sooner or later a gradual convergence of values will occur.

The second concerns energy security, which, in the wake of the recent energy price disputes between Russia and its neighbors to the West, has moved to the top of the EU agenda. Here too one can find marked differences in approach. Whereas the EU demands that the principles of the Energy Charter Treaty and market principles be incorporated into the new treaty, Russia has expressed serious reservations. It is prepared neither to accept major provisions of the Energy Charter nor to depart from its current energy strategy, with its emphasis on building national energy champions under close supervision by the government.

One can hardly expect a new treaty to resolve the fundamental differences between Russia and the EU. This requires a gradual process of »rapprochement by interlocking,« an approach first applied by the German Foreign Ministry to its Russia policy in autumn 2006. In concrete terms this would entail offering Russia an association with the EU. And more broadly, it should be accompanied by an explicit readiness to accept Russia at some future point as an EU member. Ruling membership out on principle grounds would send a negative political signal to Russia, whereas the offer of membership has proved a strong external anchor for democratic change, even in less than hospitable places.