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Politik und Gesellschaft
Online International Politics and Society 3/2000 |
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The Changing Face of Terrorism Kai Hirschmann Terrorism can be defined as
"the substate application of violence or threatened violence intended
to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents,
and to bring about political change".[1] It is a strategy of „the weak against the apparently
strong“[2], relying heavily on press coverage and modern communication channels.
With a few notable exceptions, the weapons and tactics of terrorists
have not changed, but the perceptions of threat and the vulnerability
of modern societies[3] have. New types of terrorists have emerged, some
of the old ones remain or periodically return, operating with higher
financial resources than in the past.[4] One of the most important aims
of terrorism is to create public attention or even sympathy for their
overall demands. So the main reason for terrorist attacks is not the
destruction or killing itself, but some kind of public information as
a communication strategy.[5] Or as Bruce Hoffman puts it: "Terrorists are interested in publicity,
not killing".[6] Five
motives for terrorist action can be identified:[7] ·
Ideological Terrorism: A desire for (revolutionary)
changes in political or social structures. ·
Ethno-Political Terrorism: The longing of ethnic
or political minorities in existing states for their own state or at
least a certain political and cultural autonomy. ·
Religious Terrorism: A desire to impose religion-based
norms of conduct, but also „apocalyptic fanaticism“ as is characterized
the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan.[8] ·
Single Issue Terrorism, defined as "extremist
militancy of groups or individuals protesting a perceived grievance
or wrong usually attributed to governmental action or inaction".[9] Salient issues under this definition are: the „fight“ for animal rights,
environmentalism and the „fight“ against abortion.[10] ·
The „Chosen Ones“: Mentally disturbed / deranged
single persons with a certain mission or social philosophy who plan
their terrorist attacks rationally, but without network or group support. Ideological, ethno-political
and religious terrorism is different from guerilla warfare. Both terms,
terrorism and guerilla warfare, denote irregular fighting methods that
can be combined. Nevertheless they describe different insurgent actions.
Guerilla warfare is a military strategy including annoyance, surrounding
and finally defeat of the opponent (enemy). Terrorism primarily represents
a communication strategy. It is not used primarily for destruction,
but as a „signal“ to achieve widespread psychological impact. Or as
Franz Wördemann puts it: "Guerilla fighters want to occupy the
territory, terrorists want to occupy the thinking".[11] In contrast
to guerilla fighters, terrorist do not operate as military units in
public, they do not try to conquer or defend territories, avoid fights
with regular armed forces and do not execute direct control or sovereignty
over territories and inhabitants.[12] Furthermore, in contrast to terrorists, guerilla fighters usually respect
the dividing line between combatants and not-involved civilians. New Actors, New Means Although terrorism today is
still mainly a „game of bomb and gun“, it has nevertheless been „enriched“
by new forms of terrorism and new types of actors in the 1990s. But
no clear relation is discernible between new types of terrorists and
the use of new tactics and weapons. The weapons that either new or traditional
terrorists use for their attacks depend on the effects they want to
achieve as part of their overall communication strategy. For example,
do they want to kill certain representatives of the opposed regime?
(then bombs might do the best job), do they want maximum media coverage?
(then Weapons of Mass Destruction or Cyberterrorism could be the choice
of the day), or do they want destruction with mass casualties? (several
choices). Figure 1 shows that traditional terrorists already have made
use of new weapons while new-type terrorists have relied on traditions
means.
Terrorism with political, revolutionary
or religious motivation is not a new phenomenon of the 1990s.[13] Some of the best known terrorist groups of the
1970s and 1980s have either disbanded themselves (e.g. RAF) or declared
an end to „war“ as they were finally accepted as political partners
(e.g. IRA, PLO). On the other hand, some popular terror groups of the
past keep on fighting for their more and more diffuse aims (e.g. in
the Middle East). Those which have carried on have changed their structures
and tactics. But also new adversaries with unfamiliar motivations and
different rationales have surfaced in the 1990s, e.g. groups with pseudo-religious
motivation, „single-issue“ terrorists or single persons with extremist
political positions. Between the ends of the 1960s
and the 1990s, the number of fundamentalist movements of all religious
affiliations in a broader understanding tripled world-wide. Also there
has been a virtual explosion of religious terror groups to today“s level
where almost a quarter of the terrorist groups active throughout the
world are motivated by religious concerns.[14] Another important change in terrorism is mentioned
by Taylor: "(Political; K.H.) Terrorism will continue to develop
and flourish as a tool within broader conflicts. But rather than seeing
terrorism as the traditionally-viewed instrument of ideological struggle
(of „left-right“) we will observe the growth of terrorism related to
what Huntington calls civilisations. Also we may see a rise in terrorism
related to intra-civilisation disputes, as terrorism will still remain
an attractive tool for any small, disaffected group to exercise disproportionate
influence".[15] In contrast to the stereotypical
terrorist group of the past, today's terrorists are part of amorphous,
indistinct organisations, operate on a linear rather than a hierarchical
basis, have less easily defined or identified objectives, are more willing
to inflict mass, indiscriminate casualties and claim credit less frequently
than they did in the past.[16] Laqueur points out that "in the future, terrorists will be individuals
or like-minded people working in very small groups (...). The ideologies
such individuals and mini-groups espouse are likely to be even more
aberrant than those of larger groups. And terrorists working alone or
in very small groups will be more difficult to detect unless they make
a major mistake or are discovered by accident".[17] Changes are also evident in
operations, targets, alliances and activities.[18] In the past, terrorist groups were numerically constrained and often comprised
relatively small numbers. Operations were directed against a relatively
narrow set of targets, selective and discriminate acts were typical.
Terrorists operated out of defined sanctuaries or safe-havens and their
operational areas were predictable. The threat they caused was limited
in consequences and effects. They relied exclusively on traditional
weaponry of „gun and bomb“ and on the traditional tactics such as kidnapping,
aircraft hijacking, blackmail attempts, assassinations (or attempts),
bombings etc.[19] Today's terrorists are operating
increasingly on an international level, not just in one region or country.[20] World-wide networks are rooted in transnational migrant communities. Connections
with international organized crime can be found. Terrorists have made
use enhanced propaganda opportunities and intensified lobbying and political
pressure by „political arms“ or legal support groups.[21] Increased
Vulnerability to Terrorism President Clinton points out:
"Terror has become the world's problem. Some argue, of course,
that the problem is overblown, saying that the number of deaths from
terrorism is comparatively small, sometimes less than the number of
people killed by lightning in a single year. I believe that misses the
point in several ways. (...) Terrorism has a new face in the 1990s.
Today terrorists take advantage of greater openness and the explosion
of information and weapons technology. The new technologies of terror
and their increasing availability, along with the increasing mobility
of terrorists, raise chilling prospects of vulnerability to chemical,
biological, and other kinds of attacks, bringing each of us into the
category of possible victim. This is a threat to all humankind".[22] President Clinton mentions
a very important aspect that today's societies have to be aware of:
their grown vulnerability. In fact, the „environmental conditions“ for
terrorists have changed. ·
Living in the so-called information age, people
get every possible information in very short time, they get swamped
by a growing mass of information. To get recognised, terrorists have
to plan and carry out more and more spectacular attacks with a growing
number of persons killed or injured to obtain the media coverage that
they concern to be necessary to get broad public attention. "In recent years, terrorists
have found it necessary to launch more dramatic and violent attacks
to attain the same degree of publicity and government responses that
smaller incidents previously generated. With terrorist attacks occurring
on an almost daily basis, the public and the media have become somewhat
desensitised. And with a multitude of terrorist groups „competing“ for
the international spotlight, more dramatic incidents are likely in the
future"[23], and, from another perspective, "Terrorists will seek more bang for
the buck".[24] ·
Developments in information technology make it
easier for terrorists to obtain weapon-related knowledge. Technical
developments lead to more and sophisticated weaponry. ·
Today's advanced societies are more dependent
on electronic management and transmission of information (defence, banking,
trade, transportation, transactions etc.). ·
„Social islands“ have emerged, comprised of
those who feel marginalized by and from the unfolding of the
information age.[25] ·
Along with liberal civil rights, sensitivity has
grown for ethic and environmental matters such as animal rights, environmental
protection, the question of abortion etc.. ·
Terrorism can ever more effectively be combined
with the growing and technically advanced sector of Organized Crime.[26] ·
In the post-Cold-War era, the legitimacy of a
number of states in (Eastern) Europe, Asia and Africa has been challenged
by the growing assertion of both sub-national and transnational calls
for „self-determination“ by ethnic groups and religious movements. The
level of instability and concomitant violence is further heightened
by the rise of non-state actors willing to challenge the primacy of
the state. [27] Some scientists believe that
the mentioned changes in terrorism and the surrounding environment have
created new types of terrorists. New
Types of Terrorists The
Single-Issue-Terrorist: Animals, Environment and the Right to Live The term „Single Issue Terrorism“
is accepted as extremist militancy of individuals or small groups protesting
a perceived grievance or wrong attributed to governmental action or
inaction.[28] Under this heading, three issues have gained salience: the „fight“ for
animal rights, environmentalism and the „fight“ against abortion. The issues are legitimate matters
of concern. The vast majority of „activists“
remain within the rule of law. But, comparable to ethnic, religious
or ideological issues, a small extremist minority can be called terrorists.
Smith states that "legitimate and traditionally moderate organisations
such as animal welfare societies have for years achieved notable results
on behalf of the cause for which they lobby. But, over the past two
decades, some of the more popular issues have attracted radical elements
that now form an extremist militant core prepared to resort to threats,
violence and destruction (...) to achieve their aims. In the case of
the abortion issue, this has included murder".[29] So far, the definition of terrorism given above fits perfectly. Some examples
are presented in table 2: Table 2: Incidents of Single-issue Terrorism
Source:
Smith (1998b). Although functioning domestically,
single-issue terrorists are international in scope. A certain degree
of communication takes place among extremist groups within individual
issues, mainly via Internet. The threat of single-issue terrorism is
still high; extremist incidents continue to occur in Europe and North
America. Each of the mentioned issues remains controversial and will
attract people ready to use extremist tactics and terror for selfish
and believed-to-be-altruistic reasons.[30] The challenge of the future will be to provide
an appropriate response to this threat that avoids overreaction. The „Bin-Laden-Type“ Terrorist Many scientists believe that,
in the last decade, a new type of terrorist has occurred, with the following
attributes: high financial resources, legal businesses, extremist political
or religious beliefs, no will to be directly involved in actions. Yet,
few examples can be given, because few persons have appeared on the
scene openly, so identification is one of the major challenges to intelligence-
with one notable exception: Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden can be described
as a „private terrorist“ with a „private army“ that he uses for his
interests and aims, based on a perverted understanding of Islam. The
"dealer and banker of death and terror" sees terrorism the
„marketing way“, mixing it with business. He uses his commercial contacts
world-wide to finance his terrorist activities. Experts assume that
his enormous financial resources[31] have been smuggled into the European money market. More of his money can
be found in countries which accept electronic money transfer without
checking its origin. Most of his money is hidden in legal business activities
and transactions. He is said to have business contacts with over 80
partners around the globe. Secret finance and trade agencies in Europe,
the Islamic world and the USA administer the money depots. Some of his
business partners don't even know for whom they are working. One of
bin Laden's methods is to use his money to win new friends (e.g. investments
in the banking sector in Sudan). This mixture of business and terror
was also practised in Kenya where bin Laden invested in a fish processing
factory which was later used as a logistic base for the US-embassy bombing.
Stephen Emerson, American scientist and expert on terrorism, states
that bin Laden's special ability is to effectively connect different
networks and that his strength is to consolidate diverse interests.[32] The danger and threat goes
far beyond Osama bin Laden himself. It is this new type of terrorist
with the personal abilities described above modern societies have to
be aware of. Their financial resources make them rather independent,
legal and illegal business go hand in hand. They do not need permanent
organisation structures and are therefore very difficult to detect.
So the question: „How many bin Ladens are there world-wide?“ cannot
be answered. People with the attributes listed above and the potential
of Bin Laden could be found among the organised criminals and drug barons
in Latin America or religious extremists in the Middle East and Central
Asia. To detect and eliminate further Bin-Laden-type terrorists will
be one of the main future challenges.
Weapons
of Mass Destruction in the Hands of Terrorists Interests,
Accessibility and Barriers Until the Aum cult attack with
chemical weapons in 1995, only a few scientist and policy-makers were
thinking about terrorism with „Weapons of Mass Destruction“ (WMD).[33] The world was so shocked by this incident that
the discussion intensified thereafter. WMDs are nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons. But are they an alternative to traditional weapons
for terrorist attacks? It is undoubtedly true that the use of one single
device of such weapons might kill thousands of people in a rather short
time. Protection against these weapons is very complicated or even impossible. In attempting to answer the
question, we have to keep in
mind Bruce Hoffman's thesis: "Terrorists are interested in publicity,
not killing".[34] They have to be sure that they possess the adequate technical knowledge
as well as the ability to make WMD work „at first try“ because they
will very rarely get a second chance. On the other hand, conventional
terrorism still works as the bombings e.g. in Oklahoma City, Moscow
and Dagestan have proved. Furthermore, terrorists are
very risk-averse. The use of WMD deserves more sophisticated knowledge
and bears higher risks because more complicated and complex operations
are more likely to fail. That is one of the reasons why terrorists are
politically radical, but operationally rather conservative. The vast
majority tends to adhere to the same sort of weapons they have successfully
relied on in the past or only vary them very slightly, but certainly
make use of developments in conventional weapon techniques. But some incidents in the recent
past, either attempts at stealing/smuggling of nuclear material or the
purchase of substances that can serve as ingredients for biological
and chemical weapons[35], show that non-state actors have an increasing interest in WMD.[36] Two factors are significant for terrorists interest
in WMD: ·
the increased world-wide access to materials and
know-how for the production of such weapons, and ·
the increased inclination of newly founded groups
towards pseudo-religious/ apocalyptic ideas.[37] Table 2 shows that the use
of WMD in terrorist acts is not impossible. According to Falkenrath,
a specific threat of WMD terrorism arises when a group falls into 3
categories simultaneously:[38] ·
It must be capable of acquiring and using WMD
(including all the risks), ·
It must be interested in mass-murder, and ·
It must want to use WMD to achieve it, whereby the first category
must be seen as the most crucial point. Table 2: Accessibility and Production Barriers for WMD
Weapons
Source: Neuneck (1999), p. 4. There is no obvious affinity
between the Bin Laden-type terrorist and the use of WMD. Groups capable
of carrying out mass-casualty attacks would have to be unusually organized.
Ad hoc groups that come together to carry out a specific attack or series
of attacks are more likely to meet these requirements than „traditional“
terrorist groups.[39] So far, terrorists have not demonstrated that they can fully exploit the
rising vulnerabilities of post-modern societies, nor that they desire
and are able to wield WMD instruments effectively.[40] But no doubt such weapons are a dangerous enrichment of terrorists“ repertoire
and yield a new challenge for states and policy-makers. Nuclear
Terrorism Nuclear weapons have to be
divided into two basic categories: nuclear bombs (fissile material needed)
and conventional bombs using radioactive material (non-fissile materials
possible and likely). Concerning the design of a nuclear weapon, scientific
information is not the limiting factor. The most significant technical
barriers[41] in the case of nuclear bombs are the acquisition of fissile material and
a chance of nuclear testing without getting detected, which seems to
be almost impossible. Although the scientific information is said to
be available publicly and nuclear materials might be obtained via stealing
or smuggling, building a nuclear bomb is extremely difficult. Even countries
with resources and expertise like Iraq have struggled unsuccessfully
to produce one.[42] So, a terrorist idea to produce
a nuclear bomb does not seem to be a very good and promising one. Stealing
could be an easier option. The often discussed problem of loose nukes, vagabonding nuclear material and
frustrated scientists in Russia and the CIS has to be dealt with very
seriously. The same holds for
non-proliferation in general, even though this refers primarily to states
that have launched programs to become a nuclear power. Let us assume
that it might be possible for terrorists to steal a nuclear bomb, say
in Russia. How could it be smuggled out of the country, given the size,
weight and dangers of such a bomb, and given intensified official search
for it? How can it be brought to the place where it should detonate
without being detected? It is easy to see that stealing a nuclear bomb
does not seem to be a promising way for terrorists. But the strongest
argument is that up to now the Russian nuclear weapons complex has proved
to be stable because the Russian governments have been very concerned
about security and are working to improve accountability and control.
In addition, the Russians have concentrated their warheads in fewer
locations and moved them out of areas of unrest.[43] Furthermore, the idea that any (rogue) state („State-Sponsored
Terrorism“) would hand over control of nuclear weapons to terrorists
is hard to believe because the risk that they get out of control and
turn against their patrons would be great indeed. [44] The most likely possibility
is that of stealing fissile or non-fissile material in Russia or elsewhere.
Deutch points out that "despite the number of press articles claiming
numerous instances of nuclear trafficking world-wide, we have no evidence
that any fissile materials have actually been acquired by any terrorist
organisation. We have also no indication of state-sponsored attempts
to arm terrorist organisations with the capability to use any type of
nuclear materials, fissile or non-fissile, in a terrorist act. Unfortunately,
this does not preclude the possibility that a terrorist or other group
could acquire, potentially through illicit trading, enough radioactive
material to conduct an operation, especially one designed to traumatise
a population".[45] To draw a conclusion, the highest
danger and threat does not lie in a potential terrorist use of a nuclear
bomb, but in a kind of environmental pollution with radio-active materials.
Terrorists would not necessarily need fissile materials for their purposes.
Non-fissile radioactive materials dispersed by a conventional explosive
would certainly cause damage to health, property and the environment
as well as societal and political disruption. Such materials could be
used to contaminate water supplies, business centres, government facilities
or transportation networks.[46] But, "traditional terrorist groups with established
sponsors probably will remain hesitant to use a nuclear weapon, for
fear of provoking a world-wide crackdown and alienating their supporters.
In contrast, a new breed of multinational terrorists[47] might be more likely to consider such a weapon
if it were available".[48] If a terrorist organisation
wanted to inflict mass casualties and the expected results make sense
in their overall communication strategy, it could try to use biological
and chemical weapons, which are comparatively easier to acquire or produce.[49] Biological
and Chemical Weapons[50]: Aum Shinrikyo and Beyond Biological and Chemical Weapons
(BCW) are often referred to as „poor man's nuclear bomb“. Indeed, biological
agents (pathogens such as viruses or bacteria) and chemical substances
can be obtained rather easily because they are traded mainly for medical
reasons (biological agents) or can be bought legally (chemical substances).
The knowledge of how to deal with these agents and substances is available
publicly, e.g. via books like „The Poisoner“s Handbook“ and „Silent
Death“ in the United States. So the danger of terrorist use of biological
and chemical substances to build weapons cannot be ruled out. Some of
the advantages of BCWs for terrorist use could be:[51] ·
the small quantities of toxic agents needed for
mass-destruction attacks, which limit the costs and logistic difficulties
of BCW's production or aquisition, ·
their indetectability to traditional anti-terrorist
sensor systems, ·
in some cases, the lack of an agent „signature“,
which makes it possible to disguise the cause of death, ·
the extent of shear terror and societal disruption
that may be instilled in a target population. In the past, experts considered
such a terrorist option not to be very likely. This attitude has changed
after the two terrorist attacks with chemical substances (Sarin nerve
gas) by the Aum cult in Japan: their first attack in Matsumoto killed
7 people and injured another 500, their second and better known attack
in the Tokyo subway system killed 12 people and injured approx. another
5.500. Furthermore several attempts at purchasing biological agents
or chemical substances have been made by groups and single persons around
the globe.[52] This clearly shows that terrorism with BCWs is
possible and can be called successful to a certain extent. But one has to distinguish.
Biological weapons without a system for aerosol dissemination would
not be very effective[53] and should be considered potentially dangerous contaminants rather than
WMDs..[54] An enormous mass of agents is required for inflicting mass casualties
in chemical attacks on open-air targets. The danger here lies in outdoor
attacks e.g. with a large truck bomb or indoor attacks killing a few
hundred people.[55] The groups extremely interested
in ChemBioTerrorism are cults or groups with „apocalyptic fanaticism“
like Aum Shinrikyo in Japan or the mentioned mentally disturbed/ deranged
single persons („the chosen ones“) with a certain „mission“ or „social
philosophy“. The activities of the Aum cult turned out to be the only
cases of concrete chemical terrorism. Fortunately, they did not have
any imitators. This might be a clear sign that it is not that easy to
carry out effective terrorist acts with biological or chemical weapons.
Although Aum made very costly efforts over years, they were only able
to produce Sarin of rather poor quality (diluted) which is not a very
good result compared to their inputs[56]: Aum was an organisation with over 40.000 members and had financial resources
of approx. one billion US-$, which they used to recruit scientific and
technical experts from Russia, Japan and elsewhere. As shocking as this act still
is, it also shows in retrospective that such weapons are still no alternative
to conventional weapons concerning „effective“ terrorist acts (in terms
of destruction, casualties). The reasons are:[57] ·
the technical barriers mentioned ·
the perceived uncontrollability of the agent,
including the possibility of harm to the user, ·
political disutility, including the likelihood
of alienating (potential) supporters on moral grounds, ·
fear of unprecedented governmental retribution
that might follow, ·
the lack of a perceived need for such indiscriminate,
high-casualty attacks to reach the goals of the terrorists, and ·
a general reluctance to experiment with unfamiliar
weapons. Still, there have been many
reports of terrorist threats to use BCWs in attacks. Such weapons have
also been, apart from Aum, „successfully“ used in some instances such
as product contamination and individual assassinations. But, given the
mentioned risks, why do terrorists try to use BCWs? What they want and
what they get is high media coverage and attention around the world.
So one very important reason to use WMD in the future will not be their
effectiveness, but the attention that can be caught by using them. If
this thesis holds true, it is of minor importance what overall technical
quality these weapons made by terrorists have. Another worrying aspect
is that Aum has been able to work on their weapon projects over years
without being detected by police or intelligence agencies.[58] The
Likelihood of WMD Terrorism The danger of ChemBioTerrorism
seems to be higher than that of nuclear terrorism. Walter Laqueur points
out:[59] ·
Chemical agents are easier to produce than nuclear
weapons, but very difficult to keep safely in stable conditions, and
their dispersal depends very much on climatic factors. ·
Biological agents are the most dangerous, but
storage and dispersal is even trickier than for chemical agents. Also
the risk of contamination for the people handling them is high and many
of the most lethal bacteria and spores do not survive well outside the
laboratory. ·
Given the technical difficulties, terrorists are
less likely to use nuclear devices than chemical agents, and least likely
to use biological weapons. On the whole, however, many
scientists believe that the likelihood of future use of BCWs is, in
contrast to nuclear weapons, considerable and growing. The reasons are:[60] ·
increased security against traditional types of
terrorist attacks, ·
public indifference to the latter, and the need
for more spectacular acts to attract attention, ·
a recent increase in high-casualty, indiscriminate
attacks, ·
the proliferation of BCWs and materials world-wide,
and ·
an increase in inter-ethnic and religiously-inspired
violence with fewer humanitarian inhibitions. The most important point, as
far as terrorist motivation is concerned is the additional horror that
is caused by the use of WMDs. This attaches a premium to investing in
them.[61] Especially religious or pseudo-religious cults are very tenacious. Even
after multiple failures in its efforts to use biological weapons, Aum
Shinrikyo refused to switch to conventional weapons, developing chemical
weapons instead for its attack in Tokyo.[62] Cyberterrorism Cyberterrorism is being discussed
as a new threat that terrorists might be able to cause via Internet.
Generally, two classes of disruptive activities have to be distinguished:[63] ·
„Ordinary“
Hacking: This refers to operations against target Internet
sites with the intention to cause disruption but not serious damage
(loss of life etc.). Examples are Web sit-ins and virtual blockades,
automated e-mail bombs, Web hacks, computer break-ins and computer viruses
and worms. ·
Cyberterrorism: This refers to the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It covers
politically motivated hacking operations intended to cause grave harm
such as loss of life or severe economic damage. An example would be
penetrating air traffic control systems to make planes collide. Only the latter will be considered
more detailed here. Pollit offers a good working definition of Cyberterrorism:
"Cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated attack
against information, computer systems, computer programs and data which
result in violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups
or clandestine agents".[64] Cyberterrorism offers „advantages“:[65] It can be conducted remotely and anonymously, it is relatively cheap,
it does not require the handling of explosives or a suicide mission
and it would get extensive media coverage. But there are also some drawbacks:[66] Because systems are complex, it is harder to control an attack and achieve
the desired level of damage and, unless people are injured, there is
also less drama and emotional appeal. There are two general methods
of cyberterrorism: Information technology (IT) itself is the target
and/or IT is the tool of a larger operation.[67] Table 4 shows some examples: [68] Table 4:- Tool-Target Matrix of Cyberterrorism
At present, it may seem that
there is little concrete evidence for a Cyberterrorism threat because
only few examples can be given. These are, nevertheless, very alarming:[69] ·
A „PLO“ virus was developed at Hebrew University
in Israel. ·
In Japan, groups have attacked the computerised
control systems for commuter trains, paralysing major cities for hours. ·
The Italian Red Brigade's manifesto specified
the destruction of computer systems and installations as an objective
for "striking at the heart of the state". ·
Sinn Fein supporters working out of the University
of Texas at Austin posted sensitive details about British army intelligence
installations, military bases, and police stations in Northern Ireland
on the Internet. The possibilities for hackers
to create chaos are almost unlimited and the vulnerabilities will increase.
An unnamed US intelligence official has pointed out that, with one billion
US-$ and 20 capable hackers, he could shut down America.[70] It is not hard to imagine that terrorists could
do so as well, especially when they have sufficient financial resources,
employ computer experts in legal businesses that can be used for or
merged with their true intentions and, finally, the targets are smaller
like the manipulation possibilities mentioned in table 4. Laqueur asks
the conclusive question: "Why assassinate a politician or indiscriminately
kill people when an attack on electronic switching will produce far
more dramatic and lasting results?".[71] Just recently in his statement
before the Joint Economic Committee in February 2000, John Serabian,
Information Operations Issue Manager at the CIA, draws a rather alarming
picture concerning terrorists: "We are detecting with increasing
frequency the appearance and adoption of computer and Internet familiarity
in the hands of these non-state-actors.
(...) Terrorists (...) have come to recognise that cyber weapons offer
them new, low-cost, easily hidden tools to support their causes. (...)
As we know, Middle East terrorist groups - such as Hizballah, HAMAS,
and Osama bin Ladins organisation - are using computerised files, email,
and encryption to support their orgaisations. Terrorists and extremists
already use the Internet to communicate, to raise funds, recruit, and
gather intelligence. They may even lauch attacks remotely from countries
where their actions are not illegal (...). Cyber attacks offer terrorists
the possibility of greater security and operational flexibility".[72] In summary, the use of new
technologies would certainly secure high media coverage for terrorists.
It could make sense in their overall „communication strategy“. Terrorists
have often proved that they are able to adopt technological developments
effectively. Communication technologies therefore will be a very attractive
target in future operations. Conclusion Terrorism clearly is a phenomenon
in transition. New types of adversaries have emerged in addition to
the old, new forms of terrorism have enlarged the terrorist repertoire.
New controversial issues within or between societies make for new motives
for extremist behaviour. Steven Sloan makes the point: "There are
those in the field who sometimes long for the „good old days“ when a
„terror network“ guided by Moscow could be blamed for bombings, hostage-taking,
skyjacking and other forms of mayhem".[73] Conventional terrorism will
remain the most important form of terrorism. It will be upgraded by
developments in weapon technology. Therefore, it should not be played
down. WMD terrorism might occur via single incidents but will not play
an major role in future international terrorism. Cyberterrorism still plays a minor role in contemporary terrorism. But in the future,
the largest impacts must be expected from this form of terrorism. Terrorism is more than the
changing weapons, actors and motivations:[74] It is a kind of struggle that ultimately is fought in the political arena
and, as such, is also a war of ideas and ideologies. Good intelligence
and a professional security force are necessary. But most important
for any democracy is a public that is informed and engaged, understands
the nature of the threat, its potential cost, and why the fight against
terrorism is its fight, too. References Adams, J. (1986): The
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Phänomens, Stuttgart. Collin, B.C. (1997): „The Future of Cyberterrorism: Where
the Physical and Virtual Worlds Converge“; Lecture held at the 11th Annual International Symposium on
Criminal Justice Issues, Chicago 1997. Crenshaw, M. (2000): „The Vulnerability of Post-Modern
Societies: Case Study „United States of America““; in: Hirschmann/ Gerhard,
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Gefahren“; in: S+F Sicherheit
und Frieden, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1997, pp. 218-225. Heine, P. (2000): „Religiös motivierter Terrorismus“;
in: Hirschmann/ Gerhard, Eds. (2000):
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Frankfurt a.M. Hoffman, B. (1999b): „Is Europe soft on Terrorism?“;
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1999, pp. 62-76. Kamp, K.-H. (1998): „Nuclear Terrorism is not the Core
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40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, pp. 168-171. Lange, K. (1998): „Neue Formen des Terrorismus: Aspekte
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und Zeitgeschehen, Aktuelle Analysen
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Winter 1998-99, pp. 171-175. Pollit, M.M. (1997): „Cyberterrorism: Fact or Fancy?“;
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National Information Systems Security Conference, October 1997,
pp. 285-289. Purver, R. (1995): „Chemical and Biological Terrorism:
The Threat according to Open Literature“, Canadian
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in: Journal of International Affairs,
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Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 59-75. Sloan, St. (1995): „Terrorism: How Vulnerable is the
United States?“; in: Pelletiere, St., Ed. (1995): Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front, Strategic
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and Technology, Fall 1998, pp. 68-73. Smith, G.D. (1998b): „Single Issue Terrorism, Canadian
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1996/97, pp. 3-20. Stern, J. (1998): „Apocalypse never, but the Threat is
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S. 4. Tophoven, R. (2000b): „Fundamentalistisch begründeter
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S. 4. Wördemann, F. (1977): Terrorismus. Motive, Täter, Strategien, München/ Zürich. Zunes, St. (1995): „Terrorism by another Name“; in: Peace Review, 3-4, 1995, pp. 339-345. [1] Laqueur (1996), p. 24. [2] A detailed
definition of 'Terrorism' that stresses this aspect is provided by
Hoffman (1999a). [3] For
the United States see Sloan
(1995) and Crenshaw
(2000). [4] For information on the financing of terrorists see Adams (1986). [5] This
view is shared by most scientists. Cf. Waldmann
(1999), p. 10f. as an example. [6] Hoffmann (1999). [7] For the first three, see Waldmann (2000), more detailed Waldmann
(1999). [8] A deeper inside into religious terrorism is provided
by Ranstorp (1996), Hoffman (1998), and, with a historical
perspective, Heine (2000). [9] Smith (1998b). [10] Cf. Smith (1998b),
p. 1. [11] Wördemann (1977). See also Waldmann (2000), pp. 14ff., Hoffman
(1999a), pp. 52ff. and Wördemann
(1977). [12] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,
Washington (not dated). [13] For background information on the currently existing
terrorist groups see the detailed description issued by the US-Authorities
in their 1998 terrorism report /www/
global/terrorism/1998Report). [14] Ranstorp (1996), p. 44. [15] Taylor/ Horgan (1996), p. 20. [16] Hoffman (1999). [17] Laqueur (1996), p. 34. [18] Cf. Tophoven
(1999 and 2000), Laqueur
(1996), Neuneck (1999), Hoffman (1999). [19] For a detailed analysis of traditional weaponry and tactics
see Clutterbuck (1975),
p. 39ff. [20] Deutch (1997), p. 11. [21] Hoffman (1999). [22] Remarks by the President of the United States to the
Opening Session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly,
United Nations, New York, September 21,1998, The White House, Office
of the Press Secretary. [23] Simon (1989), p. 12. [24] Deutch (1997), p. 11. [25] Cf. Lange (1998),
p. 9. [26] Lange (1998), p. 11f. calls this phenomenon 'Symbiotic Terrorism'. [27] Cf. Sloan (1995). [28]
Smith (1990), p. 7. [29] Smith (1998b), p. 1f. [30] Cf. Smith (1998b),
p. 7f. [31] At the beginning of his activities he had 300 million
$ to his disposal. The Bin Laden-Clan
made an estimated 5 billion $ in the construction business. [32] Cf. Tophoven
(2000b). [33] Cf. Stern (1998),
p. 176. [34] Hoffman (1999a). [35] A detailed list of examples of 'cases with NBC materials'
is provided by Neuneck (1999). [36] Cf. Sopko (1996), pp. 3ff. and Neuneck (1999), p. 8f. [37] Sopko (1996), pp. 3ff. [38] Falkenrath (1998). [39] Stern (1998), p. 178. [40] Pilat (1998), p. 172. [41] Falkenrath/ Newman/ Thayer (1998). [42] Kamp (1998), p. 170. [43] There were approximately over 500 nuclear storage sites
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1990 and there are less
than 100 today in Russia. [44] Cf. Kamp (1998), p. 170. [45] Testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs by the DCI, John
M. Deutch, 20 March 1996. [46] Cf. Deutch (1996),
Testimony, opt. cit. [47] For
example politically committed, mixed nationality Islamic militants
or pseudo-religious cults like Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. The latter,
known for their chemical attack in Tokyo, also tried to mine its own
uranium in Australia and to buy Russian nuclear warheads. [48] Deutch (1996), Testimony, opt. cit. [49] Falkenrath (1998). [50] For a deeper inside into the problem of chemical and
biological terrorism, see the brilliant and very detailed study by
Purver (1995) which also summarizes the
conclusions of most of the open literature. [51] Cf. Purver (1995). [52] Cf. Sopko (1996),
pp. 3ff. [53] Neuneck (1999), p. 3, and Thränert
(2000). [54] Falkenrath/ Newman/ Thayer (1998), p. 16. [55] Falkenrath/ Newman/ Thayer (1998), p. 16. [56] Cf. Thränert (2000). [57] Purver (1995). [58] Thränert (2000). [59] Laqueur (1996), p. 30. [60] For a summary see Purver
(1995). [61] Cf. Simon/ Benjamin
(2000), p. 71. [62] Cf. Simon/ Benjamin
(2000), p. 71. [63] Cf. Denning (1999), p. 1. [64] Pollit (1997), p. 285. [65] Denning (1999). [66] Soo Hoo/ Goodman/ Greenberg (1997). [67] Devost/ Houghton/ Pollard (1996). [68] The Table is based on Devost/Houghton/Pollard,
1996, and enriched with examples provided by Collin (1997). [69] Cf. Devost/ Houghton/
Pollard (1996), p.2. [70] Cf. Laqueur
(1996), p. 35. [71] Laqueur (1996), p. 35. [72] Statement for the Record before the Joint Economic Committee
on 'Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy' by John A. Serabian, Jr., Information Operations Issue Manager, Central
Intelligence Agency, 23 February 2000, Washington D.C. [73] Sloan
(1995), p. 1. [74] Cf. Chapter 9 (Responding to Terrorism) of the U.S. Department
of Defense's 1997 Annual Defense Report.
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