The interview was conducted by Hanna Voss.

Dr Esfandiary, how can the relationship between China and the countries of the Middle East be described in basic terms?

There is no love lost between China and its partners in the Middle East. China’s involvement in the region has been fitful and driven by its own self-interests, so countries in the region do not view it as a reliable partner. They do however, view it as an important partner.

Partners in the region, including most notably Iran, felt that even in the economic sphere, China was unreliable: deals would fall through, as would investments, and projects would take too long to be completed – or they wouldn’t be completed at all. Iranians do not like Chinese products, feeling they are of poor quality. Nevertheless, China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative – under which, Chinese banks and companies seek to fund and build infrastructure, including roads, power plants, ports, railways, 5G networks, and fiber-optic cables around the world – counts a significant number of Middle Eastern states as members, including Iran and the Gulf Arab states, which pride themselves on being the ‘buckle of the belt’. Nevertheless, China is an energy-hungry, economic powerhouse – this makes it an important trading partner for countries in the region.

In addition, China is an international giant that sits on the UNSC with veto power. This make it a serious heavy-hitter for countries in the region, that seek to diversify their partnerships and relationships at a time where the US is perceived to be leaving the region. China also presents them with an alternative governing model: one with significant economic development through economic liberalisation, without having to give up political control, and one that sees the world differently: not tied to Western values, and insistent on staying out of the domestic affairs of other states. This suits countries in the region.  

How are countries building ties with China? Are they adopting different approaches?

The Gulf Arab states, for example, are actively looking to build ties with countries like China, and have cultivated a deep, and multi-layered relationship with it for several years, in part to offset the effect of what they perceive to be a US withdrawal from the Middle East. While China is no replacement for the US in their eyes, it remains a significant political and security player, one which they are trying to get more involved in their region. Initially, this began with bilateral deals in the military and security sphere, such as the UAE purchase of Chinese Wing Long drones, which were used in the conflict in Yemen. Today, this has evolved into Riyadh asking Beijing to be involved in regional mediation, as we saw with the 10 March Iran-Saudi deal. Riyadh hopes that China will police the deal, and over time, that it will develop a stake in the security of the region.

For Iran, China has been a key partner at a time where the international community sought to isolate it through sanctions, one which shared its disdain for sanctions and believed that it was the US that was in the wrong when it came to pulling out of the nuclear deal.

So, does Iran have a particularly strong interest in a more meaningful role for China and why?

International efforts to isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran made it particularly keen to build relations with countries like China. While Iran and China remain suspicious of one-another and do not particularly like to work together, for Iran, China has been a lifeline at a time when few others were willing to help it. But the relationship has been fraught with difficulty and fitful. It has also been pragmatic and compartmentalised – where the two work together on areas where their interests overlap and ignore each other, when they do not.

When US President Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal in 2018, it became evident that Iran would not be able to climb out of isolation through relations with Western powers. As a result, Tehran once again turned its attention East, towards China, which it had left somewhat on the back-burner for several years since the JCPOA had been signed, in pursuit of greater ties with Europe in particular.

Since, the two countries have signed a 25-year deal that outlines boosting cooperation in different spheres, ranging from the economic to the political and the military/security sphere. As Iran builds its relationship with Russia in light of the Ukraine invasion, it will not lose sight of its efforts with China, and continues to seek Chinese investments and trade to help it overcome its economic troubles.

How did Saudi Arabia deal with the fact that its rival was increasingly turning towards China?

Saudi Arabia is also looking East, and was keen to build its relationship with China. Saudi, along with other Gulf Arab states, have been meticulous in the way they cultivated their relationship with the Chinese – unlike the Iranians who were more sporadic. Sino-Saudi relations were established in the nineties, and as China’s energy demands grew to fuel its growing economy, so did the relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states. In addition, Chinese energy imports and exports transit through choke points in the Gulf region: Nearly half of the oil and gas that China imports transits through the Strait of Hormuz, while a fifth of Chinese exports to the Middle East, North Africa and Europe go through the Bab el Mandab. So the Gulf Arab states are important to China, and China is key to them, especially as an energy hungry giant.

But their interactions were and certainly are not limited to energy, are they?

Certainly not: Chinese exports to the Gulf Arab states grew exponentially as well, driven by growing demand in the Gulf states thanks to a burgeoning middle class and a need for consumer goods. More recently, the Gulf Arab states have been eager to get China more involved politically in the region. Given the perceived US retreat from the Middle East, they seek alternative foreign powers with influence to have a stake in the security of the region. While China has been resistant to this in the past, it may be that its significant economic and energy interests in the region inevitably drags Beijing in politically. More recently, China’s surprising brokering of the Iran-Saudi deal in March, demonstrates that Beijing seems eager to explore its mediation potential in the region.

How is China assessed in the Middle East compared to the USA?

The US is the primary security guarantor of the Gulf Arab states. That will not change for the foreseeable future, though the nature of the relationship between the Gulf Arab states and the US is already changing. Gulf Arab leaders would rather they maintain the US as their primary security guarantor, but they no longer want a relationship where they have to acquiesce to US asks and interests, without consideration for their own interests.

Today, they are more assertive, and willing to pursue foreign policy objectives and interests that do not necessarily align with the US and its allies. This has complicated the relationship, and is a new reality that all those involved have to adjust to. This, combined with the perception that the US is not a reliable partner, because it aims to leave the region and has less of a stake in its security, has made the Gulf Arab states more willing to search elsewhere for partners.

Enter China.

The Gulf Arabs and others in the region view the country as another major power with significant capabilities and a real economic might. What is particularly attractive for them, is that China proposes an alternative to the US that does not include Western values like human rights or interference in domestic affairs as a corollary of partnership. In fact, Beijing is adamant in its pursuit of non-interference in domestic affairs. This gives China added credibility and clout in this region.

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Beirut recently conducted a survey on the perception of the Ukraine war in the MENA region. It was not directly about the role of China and yet we could detect a kind of superpower fatigue. Many people in the Middle East are tired of the interference of foreign powers; will this become relevant in any way for China?

It is unlikely to apply to China for now, because Beijing’s model has been one where it does not traditionally interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries, and in turn, expects them not to interfere in its domestic affairs.

But still, can we speak of a turning point in the Middle East? Or are we prematurely putting down the USA?

There is no turning point in terms of the US being the primary security guarantor in the region – it remains so for now, and countries in the region would ideally want it to remain so for the foreseeable future. But the countries in the region will no longer deal with just the one country, they want to diversify their partnerships and relationships, and this is where China comes in. That will not change. China’s importance to the region will only grow.

What does China's growing influence in the region mean for Europe?

China’s growing clout in the region will have repercussions for Europe and its allies. It, for example, provides an alternative for countries in the region which means that they are no longer bound to just the US and Europe, but have someone else that is large, economically and politically significant and influential. This potentially diminishes Europe’s reach into the region, especially when the focus in Europe is on issues that frustrate countries in the region, like human rights and Western values.

China’s growing involvement in the region means that it will be harder for Europe to isolate individual countries in the region as means of punishment or obtaining behaviour change. Sanctions, for example, will not have the same effect, since they will not be universally implemented unless a country like China is on board. This makes policy-making on the region harder and more complicated.