For Turkey, Germany is one of the three most important countries, along with the United States and Russia. And Germany also pays special attention to its very complicated relations with Turkey. For more than two decades, Germany has had to deal with a country that has changed its ideology, policies and overall strategic thinking, and Berlin has had to adopt the variable characteristics of the Erdoğan governments. Now, Germany facing the most challenging security threat in decades, its coalition government has begun to enact a dramatic turn in its foreign and security policy, the consequences of which for Turkey remain to be seen.

While Germany outsourced its security to the United States and NATO and its energy security to Russia, it similarly outsourced handling refugees to Turkey from the mid-2010s. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has disrupted at least some of the pillars of this approach, forcing Germany to reconfigure its alignments and security architecture. The extent to which this new turn in German strategic thinking will lead to changes in bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany is an ongoing debate.

Berlin has long been indifferent to Turkey's democratic backsliding

The rationale behind former Chancellor Merkel’s policies toward Russia and China was that growing trade and investment would drive these countries to liberal reforms, and they would eventually integrate into the Western system, rendering the German approach of "change through trade" effective. It seems to have failed in both cases. Notably, while the Merkel governments pursued a policy of change through trade towards Russia and China, they pursued a policy of indifference towards Turkey's democratic backsliding. The common perception in Turkey is that the Merkel governments tacitly supported Erdoğan for the sake of an unethical refugee deal. Chancellor Merkel lent her support at critical junctures, such as her controversial visit to Ankara before the November 2015 elections and Germany's went along with the Erdoğan government's growing human rights violations.

Erdoğan's government presented crucial benefits for Germany in at least three areas:

First and foremost, the refugee deal of March 2016 was a major success for Chancellor Merkel government because it relieved Germany of a pressing refugee influx. Keeping Syrian and other refugees in Turkey was a cost-effective solution.

Second, Erdoğan lost interest in the EU accession process, which would have required further democratic reforms incompatible with his authoritarian tendencies. A Turkish government that did not pursue membership served to drop one of the most contentious issues in the relationship, and the Merkel governments did not have to deal with the intricate politics involving a meaningful Turkish EU-accession process.

Third, despite the problems Erdoğan has caused in Germany and regionally, he has also shown to know his limits, he backs down under pressure, and is open to transactionalism, which has become an asset in foreign relations.

While liberal sections of Turkish society are dissapointed - conservatives are suspicious

On the other hand, liberal sections of Turkish society and the democratic opposition in the country were already disappointed by Germany's and the EU's appeasement of Erdoğan's growing authoritarian rule and their inaction beyond rhetoric in the face of the Erdoğan government's crackdown on prominent dissenters and civil society at large. Interestingly, under the influence of Erdoğan's public statements and pro-government media's anti-Western, anti-EU and occasionally anti-German rhetoric (he himself went so far as to call the German government "Nazi remnants"), conservative segments of society have also developed a rather negative image of Germany on the grounds that Germany provides shelter to terrorists such as Gülen/FETÖ and the PKK.

When the "traffic light" coalition came to power in Berlin, the pro-EU sections of Turkish society had low expectations regarding a values-based approach to Turkey by Germany. They even ridiculed the EU and Germany for the fact that Brussels and Berlin would issue the same "deeply concerned" statement on almost every blatant human rights violation in Turkey. However cautions, the fact that the Greens took control of the Foreign Ministry, given their past statements and positioning as strong critics of Erdoğan's policies, led to some hopes on the part of Turkey’s liberals that the new coalition government would emphasize democratization and human rights issues with regard to Turkey. But this did not happen.

The new coalition government followed a similar line to the Biden administration. Relations were institutionalized personal contacts between Erdoğan and Chancellor Scholz have been scarce. While the new chancellor called Erdoğan only 11 days after taking office and Scholz paid a visit to Turkey in March 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, even this was far from a cordial meeting. There was no press conference, Scholz's team was small, and the visit took place under the clouds cast by the War in Ukraine.

Germany remains dependend on Turkey to fill its "Zeitenwende" with life

Thus, for various reasons, the Zeitenwende has so far not been extended to relations with the Erdoğan government. Conversely, in order to implement its change in foreign and security policy, Germany is somewhat forced to maintain the current form of bilateral relations with Turkey. The War in Ukraine has already caused another influx of refugees. Under these circumstances, it would be too risky for Germany to reconsider and revise the deal it made with the Erdoğan government.

Second, Turkey's role in the Ukrainian war is crucial, since Turkey controls the strategically significant straits and Erdoğan has emerged as a key mediator in securing the grain corridor, alleviating food shortages in the Middle East and North Africa which could have had negative consequences for the EU.

In conclusion, it seems that the Scholz government, at least under the current circumstances, does not prioritize relations with Ankara, shies away from criticizing human rights issues in Turkey, and avoids any radical change in the policy line adopted by the previous Merkel governments.

Dr. Ilhan Uzgel was professor of international relations at Ankara University until his dimissal by presidential decree in 2017. Since, he has been a commentator and op-ed writer on foreign policy issues for various national and international news media.

All opinions expressed in this piece are solely the author's and can in no way be associated with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the editorial team.