An Evolving Crescendo with a Grand Finale: Election Campaigns in Iran

Adnan Tabatabai

We are only a few weeks from June 18th, when the 13th presidential election of the Islamic Republic, founded in 1979, will be held in Iran. There has, however, been no euphoria so far: Iran’s population is enduring a crisis-ridden period with multiple sociopolitical tensions and an acute economic downturn.

Although the U.S. sanctions regime is cited as one of the main reasons for these crises, Iranians also hold their own political elite responsible. This is reflected in clearly perceptible political apathy. In telephone interviews on the presidential election conducted in April by the student polling institute ISPA, only 43% of respondents said they intended to vote. The state broadcaster IRIB has its own polls indicating that 51% of the population has no intention of participating in the elections. Disenchantment with politics is one explanation for these low figures, but it is also important to bear in mind that Iran is currently undergoing its fourth COVID-19 wave. This will affect voter turnout on election day, as well as the election campaigns that are slowly but surely beginning.

Elections in Iran are characterized, inter alia, by very short election campaigns that begin unassumingly but gather speed as they move toward their conclusion, akin to a musical crescendo. The closer it is to election day, the more dynamism the election campaign develops. In previous elections, the overall mood among the electorate has tilted in a particular direction only in the final days before the election. That is one reason why it is almost impossible to predict the outcome of elections in Iran, particularly when the head of state will certainly change – having served two terms in office, the incumbent president Hassan Rouhani is not allowed to stand for re-election.

There have been surprises in the past: it should be noted that Mohammad Khatami, a Reformist, won in 1997 contrary to all expectations, while in 2005 commentators had not reckoned with Principlist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. And in 2013 future president Hassan Rouhani scored just 6% in opinion polls ten days before the election.

Contrary to a whole host of gloomy assertions, the short election campaign phase is therefore highly significant. That means it merits a closer look.

In the Media (Broadcasters, Print Media, Online)

Despite the red lines for public discourse in the Islamic Republic, the state media do feature controversial discussions on domestic and foreign policy issues. In this context, the Iranian media landscape’s fragmentation along political lines is significant. With the exception of a few economic, cultural, and sports media outlets, all news media are largely or entirely affiliated with a political figure or a political group. In the absence of effective political parties and party manifestos, these media outlets play a particularly significant role in conveying political messages and concepts into the public discourse. Current affairs are thus constantly packaged in narratives intended to serve the interests of various political camps.

Iranian state television tends to place greater emphasis on diverse media content in the run-up to elections. However, this content also tends to mirror elite discourse rather than reflect the general public’s concerns. The latter are instead espoused by satellite channels operating from abroad, some with considerable audience share within Iran. However, those channels are not unproblematic either, given their questionable financing models (especially in the case of “Iran International”) and tendency to disregard international journalistic standards. Nevertheless, they undoubtedly influence political debates in the country.

In addition to these media outlets, there is also the seemingly endless sphere of social media. At present, the Clubhouse app is the latest discourse-driven space to bring together political figures and activists from home and abroad who represent various political positions. On Clubhouse these figures enter into candid debates with officials of the Islamic Republic, sometimes for hours. The app’s limited reach within society is expanded when content from Clubhouse rooms is disseminated on Telegram, Twitter and Instagram. Such discourse will presumably be as important in the upcoming election campaign as the forthcoming TV debates between the candidates. Conversations on Clubhouse unfold much more organically and are more accessible than the TV debates, which at times appear to be meticulously choreographed.

Provincial trips

Compared to interaction in the digital realm, personal exchanges on the ground have a much more immediate impact. During his presidency, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad established the practice of visiting the country’s 30 provinces as an effective way to assert his presence in regions far from the capital. Ahmadinejad had many imitators on this front, even though there is no certainty that every trip garnered a significant number of additional votes.

In this context, it is telling that Ebrahim Raisi, now the outgoing head of the judiciary, has traveled to 28 of Iran’s 30 provinces during his two years in office (since March 2019) – highly unusual for a judiciary chief, but entirely logical in light of his presidential ambitions.

Iran is certainly a centrally governed country, with the capital, Tehran, as its political epicenter. Looking at the country as a whole, however, reveals that voter turnout is lower in urban centers than in rural areas. ISPA currently reports a 43% to 59% difference. That means that traveling to remote provinces can help a candidate with a well-conceived political program come across as a unifying figure and tap into new constituencies.

Renowned Supporters and “Kingmakers”

In past elections, figures from the political elite, referred to as “kingmakers”, have always played an important role in election campaigns. In 2013, for example, one hallmark of Hassan Rouhani’s success in the elections was the last-minute boost he received when former President Mohammad Khatami offered his support just two days before the election. The late Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani also added his political heft to Rouhani’s candidacy. However, there is no longer anyone on the scene with that kind of political gravitas, which means there are currently no true “president makers.”

Meanwhile, given the current political apathy among the Iranian public, the wave of support that emerged in 2017 from cultural and sporting celebrities for Rouhani’s re-election is unlikely to materialize this time. While well-known clerics can mobilize only a limited number of votes, their support for particular candidates may increase these would-be presidents’ prestige among the political elite. On that front, former Speaker of Parliament and presidential candidate Ali Larijani has received particularly extensive backing from renowned Grand Ayatollahs of Qom.

An Evolving Crescendo with Rallies, Street Campaigning and TV Debates

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is highly improbable that the candidates will have a chance this year to organize gatherings in sports indoor arenas, stadiums, and public squares – and if such events do take place, they will involve a much smaller audience. Rallies in general, which are sometimes major spectacles, used to illustrate the candidates’ strength and popularity. They also testified to the electorate’s dynamism. This important part of the crescendo, which typically culminates in lively marches through urban centers on the last day of the election campaign, is almost inconceivable this year.

The usual feedback loop between street campaigning and TV debates may well not emerge this year. Nevertheless, the TV duels between the candidates will once again be critical. Experience from past elections suggests that the main candidates from the two camps will be backed up during the debates by one or two colleagues who are also approved as candidates but in the end withdraw from the race. In 2017, Eshagh Jahangiri and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in particular played that role for Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi. A similar process is likely to play out again this year, depending on which candidates the Guardian Council allows to run in the end.

The length of the actual election campaign will ultimately depend on whether the Guardian Council comes to a final decision after just five days of vetting and announces the approved candidates on May 21st or takes five more days and only gives the starting signal for the election campaign on May 26th – just three weeks before the election. It’s hard to imagine that this campaign will cause voter turnout to shoot back up to well over 60% or 70%. Still, if there is anything the last twelve rounds of presidential elections have had in common, is that they have all borne surprises.

Adnan Tabatabai is co-founder and CEO of the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO). A political analyst on Iranian affairs, Tabatabai acts as advisor to European policy-makers and business-leaders on domestic and foreign policy issues related to Iran.

On Twitter: @A_Tabatabai