The Greek perspective is explained by Ulrich Storck, head of the FES’s country office in Athens
FES: How does the situation at the EU’s external border look from the point of view of the Greek government?
Ulrich Storck: Since the Turkish government announced that it was “opening the gate” at the end of February and began to look the other way when people headed for the border, Greece has felt “under attack” by its neighbor. People talk about a “hybrid war” by Turkey against Greece, in which refugees are misused as weapons. The initial reaction was to close the border and keep it sealed with the help of additional police and military units. Migrants who do manage to get across are detained or immediately returned. Greece’s current emergency legislation—which is impermissible under international law, because it suspends asylum proceedings—allows the Greek authorities to take into custody migrants arriving by land or water and send them back without registration or due process of law.
At the same time, a propaganda battle has broken out at the borders, both the land border at the Evros River and the Greek islands close to Turkey. Social media present images that supposedly document mistreatment at the hands of the Greek police. There is even talk of deaths, although none has been confirmed so far. But if détente does not come fairly quickly, it seems only a matter of time before the first victims turn up and usher in the next phase of escalation. It is still difficult to verify information because both the Turkish and Greek sides are interfering with journalists’ work.
We can only hope that a compromise will be reached before too long with the Turkish leadership to relieve pressure on the EU’s external border. Even if Frontex deploys a few additional boats and personnel, as it has promised, the maritime borders can hardly be kept sealed on a permanent basis without cooperation from Turkey.
How is the Greek public reacting to the events?
In a way that transcends political outlooks and party boundaries, the country has closed ranks behind the government’s hard line. For months, reports about the Turkish leadership’s aggressions and provocations have dominated the news. Not only continuing violations of Greek air space by this NATO partner, but even its territorial claims to Greek islands and their potentially resource-rich continental shelf stoke the bilateral feuds. According to opinion surveys, over half of the Greek population expect an armed conflict with their neighbor in the course of this year, and that was even before the current crisis erupted.
Regrettably, this situation, advertised as a “case of national defense,” offers nationalistic and extreme right-wing groups welcome leeway for agitation. Nationalistic, xenophobic, and right-wing extremist rhetoric is reproduced on a grand scale by social media around the country, and it does influence public opinion. In the affected border regions, self-proclaimed “citizens’ militias” are forming with the declared aim of “defending” the border and the islands against the refugees. Of course, right-wing extremist groups and networks already had formed well before the current crisis, yet now they are emerging from the shadows and fanning the flames of an already overheated situation even more. In this regard, they find an echo in the right-wing nationalist networks all over Europe, including Germany and especially the AfD.
Do you think that this development could have been foreseen?
Although the EU-Turkey Agreement of 2015 created a much-needed instrument to stop the flow of large numbers of refugees and migrants into Europe, especially Germany, its weak points readily became apparent. On the one hand, it required that the Turkish leadership be willing to cooperate, but on the other, it counted on mechanisms of repatriation from the Greek side that the asylum authorities there were never in a position to carry out—or not willing to do so, when the Syriza government was in power. While the EU half-heartedly tried to build up Greece’s administrative capacities and wore itself out in struggles with a bureaucracy that was already inefficient, everyone persisted in turning a blind eye to Erdogan. The “open the gate” policy on the part of a country that in the interim has had to care for nearly 4 million refugees had been announced more than once. Europe both made itself vulnerable to extortion and simultaneously denied Turkey any further concessions or aid. Thus, it was only a matter of time before a crisis such as the present one would break out. The root of the problem clearly lies in the wars in Syria—and in the fact that Europe’s decision to ignore what was happening did not contribute to any solution, but instead opened the way for escalation.
What do the Greek people and their government expect now from the European Union? How much responsibility do you think Germany should assume for finding a solution to the current crisis?
First and foremost, people expect European solidarity and a clear admission that we are facing a European crisis, not just a Greek one. For a long time, Greece, as a front-line country and gatekeeper of the EU, has felt abandoned in its efforts to deal with the migration pressure that has been building mightily over the past few months, especially in the hotspots of the Aegean. The visit of the European presidential trio was a grand gesture that did show solidarity, especially because it included considerable, newly-pledged financial support. Yet even in the best case these gestures will be little more than stopgap solutions.
Anyone who really wants to find a solution has to dare to tackle Europe’s asylum policy. The Greeks know very well that their country is not the final destination of the migrants. Without exception, all migrants want to travel farther north to their dream destination: Germany. For quite some time the Greek government has reminded everyone that the burden of taking in refugees should be distributed across the EU, and that the Dublin Accord needs to be reformed. Since Germany is the principal destination country, people expect that it ought to lobby more vigorously for a European solution of this kind. One way of accomplishing that goal would be to take advantage of the ongoing EU budgetary negotiations to make the allocation of structural funds, especially to the countries of Eastern Europe, contingent on their willingness to cooperate and show solidarity on the issue of distributing refugees within the Union. Germany is often accused of being too close to the Turkish leadership. Because Merkel was the principal sponsor of the 2015 Agreement, she should bear personal responsibility for it, including for its possible failure.
If one wants to address the causes of the crisis and not just its symptoms, one has to deal with Syria. For too long, Europe and Germany have stood helplessly on the sidelines of events there, refusing to get involved or bring any influence to bear on the crisis. People expect Europe and especially its protagonists, Merkel and Macron, to engage in negotiations with Putin, forcefully emphasizing certain goals: not merely facilitating an armistice, but also monitoring it and arranging for safe zones, thereby playing an active part in ending the flight and misery of the people in the region. Right now, Macron and France are perceived as Greece’s closest international friend. But also, because she is trusted by both sides, Angela Merkel is especially well-suited to play the role of broker in negotiations between Erdogan and Putin for peace in Syria.