Goals and expectations of the asylum compromise

The so-called asylum compromise of the EU member states of June 2023, which is still being negotiated in detail in the trilogue with the European Parliament and the Commission, has been celebrated as a historic "breakthrough". Will it achieve the expected goals? Will it pave a socially satisfying way for the asylum and refugee policy that has failed so far? Will the intended deterrence through rapid deportation work and stop internal migration within the EU? Will it calm the debates in European states on the issue of migration? Will it take away the potential for agitation of the extreme right?

There is little evidence to suggest this. After all, there is little that is new compared to previous asylum policy. In principle, the Dublin System remains in force. Cooperation with "safe third countries" were supposed to accelerate repatriation before. Their number is to be expanded and perfected into an impenetrable cordon sanitaire around the EU. But how? Above all, neighbouring African states are to close their borders to the EU and, if possible, provide places for exterritorial EU asylum screening. None of this has worked so far. Only a "solidarity mechanism" between EU states seems to be new.
 

The solidarity mechanism does not deliver what it promises

This could bring about a turnaround if it resulted from a solidarity-based change of attitude on the part of the EU states, or at least offered a new, effective incentive system. But there is no talk of this. Highly complicated regulations are formulated in detail, but are also vague and often incomprehensible, with regard to the obligations of the individual states.  They testify to a deep mistrust not only of the refugees, but also of the states among themselves. Time-consuming interpretations will be needed here to reach agreement. The gap between the EU's internal states and those at the external border, which has lasted for years, still remains. The individual states are left with almost unlimited scope for decision-making in order to achieve solidarity, at least on paper.
 

The EU is trying to "offload" the solution to the asylum issue to Africa, to Africa’s detriment

More and more "safe third countries" are to "outsource" the asylum requirement for the EU behind the external borders. This confirms the EU's previous policy towards the neighbouring continent: African states are being instrumentalised for EU interests more and more unabashedly, even if this entails disadvantages and political destabilisation for them. In principle, they are supposed to hermetically seal the borders between themselves. But this also makes trade between them more difficult. In this way, the EU is undermining the self-imposed development goal of the West African Economic Union ECOWAS. ECOWAS has complained about this before. 

In sub-Saharan Africa, this could now be seen at first hand. Even Niger, on which the EU had firmly and at the same time ruthlessly relied, distanced itself after the coup, and this will not be reversed. The hostile mood against the West is increasing, poisoning the political climate and undermining any genuine cooperation based on partnership.
 

Cynical treatment of human rights and international law

It is easy to see that, contrary to the lip service paid by the EU, human rights and international law do not count. In the days when the President of the Commission praises the exemplary nature of the agreement with Tunisia, pictures of refugees arrested by the Tunisian government and abandoned in the desert without food and protection go around the world. This was confirmed by the Tunisian Interior Minister a few days later. More cynicism is not possible.
 

Result: Disappointed expectations, disgruntled EU citizens, strengthening of the far right

The new asylum decision will not stop "illegal" migration to Europe and within the EU, perhaps it will even increase it. The causes of flight, which essentially determine the number of refugees, are increasing. Smugglers will find ever more expensive and dangerous ways to circumvent the arrival centres. European citizens will realise that democratically elected politics is incapable of regulating migration in a pacifying way, despite announcements to the contrary. The right-wing extremists will gain even more support. And no one should say that this was not foreseeable.
 

Liberal partnership of shared interests and cooperation as an alternative

The alternative is a migration policy that relies on voluntariness and the recognition of mutual interests, and thus putting an end to the incitement of the topic. The "Berlin Governance Platform" has worked out strategies for this and has already tried them out successfully, e.g. with a matching system. According to this system, the decentralised settlement of recognised asylum refugees ­– the central point of contention between the EU states – is "matched" according to the interests of the municipalities and of the refugees with the help of an algorithm. In agreement with the nation states, municipalities publish their wishes and needs to arriving refugees, which are then compared with the needs and wishes of the refugees by means of an algorithm. A new incentive system would come from an EU fund, from which the integration of the refugees would be financed and - very important! -  the same amount of investment by the host municipality would be spent for local residents. Also, migration partnerships could be expanded. These are only a few pieces in the mosaic of the new overall strategy, which is needed and is possible.

We still have a choice: Either the old migration policy will destroy the EU from within, or we take a bold turn in favour of our democratic values and our long-term interests, on an equal footing with the interests of the Global South.