1. Strategy Debates of Swedish Parties in the European Elections 2019

Kristdemokraterna (KD) wants to make the EU "Lagom" (Moderate) again, i.e. to reduce the influence of the Union with respect to national welfare models, family politics and social insurance systems. While improving and extending cooperation regarding “genuinely transnational” issues such asorganized crime, terrorism, pollution, and migration, which it shares with Sverigedemokraterna (SD), Moderaterna (M) and - to a lesser degree - Vänsterpartiet (V). The party’s climate agenda is nearly identical to the programme of Moderaterna, including: a climate-neutral Europe by 2050 (meaning that greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced to net zero across Europe by 2050), more investments in nuclear energy, and extending the emissions-trading system to more sectors and countries outside the EU.KD also wants to increase and deepen multilateral free-trade agreements, positions shared by S, M and SD. The support for KD has been steadily growing since party leader Ebba Busch Thor announced that cooperation with Sverigedemokraterna was unavoidable and opened up for potentially cooperating with them in March 2019. Although the party grew by 2.7 per cent compared to 2014, it did not receive as much support as predicted in opinion polls. One possible reason for this was the revelation that Lars Adaktusson - one of the party’s former MEP’s - had voted against women’s right to abortion 22 out of 28 times during his term as a MEP, despite the party’s support for Swedish abortion laws, which might have created confusion among the electorate regarding the party’s position on the issue.

• The Christian Democratic party Kristdemokraterna (KD) made strides in the election and grew by 2.7 per cent compared to 2014.
• Many of KD’s core-concerns are shared with Moderaterna and Sverigedemokraterna
• The focus of the party’s campaign was to “make EU ‘lagom’ again” and prevent retrenchment of the Swedish welfare system. 
• The success of the party can largely be attributed to domestic factors, principally by opening up for collaboration with Sverigedemokraterna.
• The party didn't grow as much as estimated before the election, due to a scandal involving a former MEP.

KD is located close to Moderaterna (M) along both the left/right and authoritarian/libertarian dimensions. Their voters are also positioned similarly, although KD voters are more evenly distributed between libertarian/authoritarian positions than KD sympathisers. Christian Democrat voters are distributed almost exclusively on the right side of the spectrum, with higher concentration close to the centre-right. There is a discrepancy between the party-position and the position of their more authoritarian sympathisers, concentrated closer to Sverigedemokraterna (SD) than KD along the authoritarian/libertarian, EU dimension. This suggests that the party’s acceptance of cooperation with SD, which signalled that a coalition between SD, M and KD as a conservative block might be possible, might have pleased many SD voters who are now contemplating KD to a greater extent than previously. However, it is important to not overemphasize the prospects for such a coalition for the time being, especially since several important cleavages have erupted between new and old KD voters, party-members and sympathisers after the election, most crucially with respect to abortion and migration. KD’s principal challenge henceforth is how to handle the reorientation of the party; whether to prioritize voter-retention and its identity as a Christian-democratic party, or whether to direct the party toward the right-authoritarian direction, which has proved somewhat successful over the past year.

Sverigedemokraterna (SD) grew by +5.7 per cent compared to 2014 and became the third largest party, mirroring its position in the 2018 general election when it grew by 4.7 per cent, compared to the 2014 general election. According to party leader Jimmie Åkesson, the long-term goal of the party in the European parliament is to undermine the hegemony of left-liberals and federalists and to transfer authority back to the member states: to “reclaim control.” As the most socially conservative Swedish party, SD emphasizes traditional “law and order”- issues: a stricter immigration policy, stronger border controls, curbing transnational theft-leagues, and constraining the freedom of movement for criminals by e.g. allowing member states to introduce visa-requirements. These concerns are shared by Moderaterna (M), and to some degree Kristdemokraterna (KD). The party is in favor of the single market and enhancing free trade agreements like M and S, but also wants to reduce EU’s budget like Vänsterpartiet (V) and curb “frivolous waste” of Swedish tax money in the EU like KD. Consequently, the party has proposed abolishing the European Structural funds and the Cohesion fund. Together with V, SD is the most Eurosceptic Swedish party, but it is also - in contrast to V - located at the “far right” along the TAN-side of the spectrum.

• The right-wing nationalist party Sverigedemokraterna (SD) grew by +5.7 per cent compared to 2014 and became the third largest party of the Swedish EU election
• The goal of the party is to limit EU’s influence and transfer authority back to the member states: to “reclaim control.”
• SD emphasizes “law and order” issues such as a stricter migration policy and a stronger border control.
• SD and the left party (V) are the most Eurosceptic Swedish parties, despite their detrimental position on the right-left scale.
• Nevertheless, SD supports the EU single market and free trade agreements like the Social Democrats (S) and the moderate right (M).

The right-wing nationalist party Sverigedemokraterna (SD) is an outlier with respect to the authoritarian/libertarian axis, since it positioned further toward the authoritarian side than any other party. However, SD sympathisers are much more libertarian and economically centrist than the party itself, while SD voters are more closely aligned with the party position along the libertarian/authoritarian dimension, yet still diverging along the left-right axis. The voters and sympathisers of SD, Moderaterna (M) and Kristdemokraterna (KD) are all located at almost the same position along the economic axis, clustered to the centre-left of their respective party positions. The differences between these voter groups and their party affiliations are consequently not primarily about economic issues such as market liberalization and labour flexibility, but rather issues related to sovereignty, European integration, national identity etc. The fact that SD has been able to formulate a coherent (Eurosceptic and anti-globalisation) policy position with respect to these issues might have influenced their electoral success in the 2019 EU election. Moreover, the significant overlap between KD sympathisers and SD voters indicates that the latter - albeit almost exclusively distributed over the authoritarian right quadrant - are positively inclined toward KD, and might regard it as a second-order preference. The same is true - although to a lesser degree – for SD sympathisers, who are less concentrated, but nonetheless closer to KD voters than to any other group of voters. The divergence between the more “radical” position of the party and its more “moderate” sympathisers might be a manifestation of the party’s ability to attract more centre-right and even centre-left voters, which can be illustrated by the overlap between SD sympathisers and M- and to a lesser degree S voters.

Moderaterna (M) also grew in the EU election, from 13.6 per cent in 2014 to 16.8 per cent in 2019, making it the second largest party after S, and the largest Swedish right-wing party in the European Parliament. In contrast to SD and KD however, M is less internally cohesive. Since 2014, the party has changed its leader twice and experienced an "identity crisis": from the more liberal position of former party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt, toward a more traditionally conservative position in recent years, especially with respect to migration and integration, law and order, and asylum-politics. The party has also struggled with flight of liberal voters to Centerpartiet (C)since the “migration crisis” and conservative voters to SD and KD, but judging from the success in the European election, the party now seems to have temporarily recovered, which might be attributed to its reorientation towards more conservative (or TAN-oriented) positions, closer to KD and SD. Aside from the concerns it has in common with SD, M is also in favour of more European cooperation with regard to a common security policy and free trade agreements, like Socialdemokraterna (S), an expansion of nuclear energy in Europe, like KD, and deepening the single market. The party has moved toward a more Eurosceptic stance since the days of Carl Bildt - party leader in the 90’s, and is now closer to KD’s “make EU ‘Lagom’ again” than envisioning an “ever closer union.”

• The Center-right party Moderaterna (M) gained 3.2 per cent compared to 2014 and became the largest Swedish right-wing party in the European Parliament.
• Like Sverigedemokraterna (SD)and Kristdemokraterna (KD), the party emphasized subsidiarity-issues, law-and-order, migration and border control.
• The party is less cohesive than SD and KD and is divided between a conservative and a liberal wing.
• Since 2014, the party has shifted towards the conservative side, which might partially account for its success.
• It has also moved toward a more “eurosceptic” position, compared to its enthusiasm for European integration since the 1960’s.

M became the largest Swedish right-wing party after the EU election, growing by 3.2 per cent compared to 2014. Since 2014, the party has shifted more toward the conservative side of the political spectrum, which might partially account for this success. M voters are more concentrated than KD voters, with the majority having slight preference for libertarian over authoritarian positions. Like KD voters, M voters are also distributed almost exclusively on the right side of the spectrum, with higher concentrations close to the centre, although M voters are located marginally to the right of KD voters. With regard to M sympathisers, the vertical shape of their position and distribution suggests that the party appeals to a wider distribution of voters along the authoritarian/libertarian dimension than the right-left dimension, which is consistent with the party’s conservative-liberal ideology. This might be a strategic advantage for M, since it enables the party to attract right-wing voters across both the libertarian and authoritarian sides of the political spectrum. Furthermore, there is an overlap between SD sympathisers and M voters, which indicates that those who voted for M also sympathise with the more Eurosceptic and anti-immigration position of SD. This might pose a problem to M, since its own sympathisers are more dispersed, while its concentrated base is sympathetic to SD’s policy stances. While this dispersion indicates that M might have greater possibilities to appeal to new voters than, for instance, the social democrats (S), it could also increase tensions within the party across libertarian-lines. Hence, the party faces a similar dilemma as KD.

Socialdemokraterna (S) remained the largest Swedish party with 23.6 per cent of the vote, but this was also its worst ever result in an European election. However, in contrast to centre-left parties in countries like the UK, Germany, Italy and France, S has been more resilient and managed to avoid a dramatic drop. Like M, Socialdemokraterna has suffered from voter flight to SD for years, which can be partially attributed to the disappearance of the internationalist-oriented working class as a political force, and partially to the rural-urban divide: S has lost support among rural voters, who are moving toward SD, while growing marginally among the urban middle-class since 2018. The party is also internally divided: in February 2019 a group of left-wing members of S created Reformisterna as a response to Januariavtalet, which they interpreted as the culmination of a long journey toward the right for S. The purpose of Reformisterna is to reorient the party toward the left, which has raised concerns of a reiteration of the 1980’s “Rosornas krig”, i.e. the conflict between more liberal S-members centered around Stockholm, and the party-base in the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO). The Party leadership conceived of the election as a quasi-apocalyptic confrontation between progressive and regressive forces in the Union, where failure to deter the right-wing threat could mean the end of Europe as we know it. Despite emphasizing the need for fair conditions on the labour market for workers, social justice, the importance of defending Swedish collective bargaining agreements against encroachments, and better climate protection, some party-activists from the LO-base argued that the rhetoric about the right-wing threat drew attention from other issues, which according to them might account for S’ inability to attract more blue-collar and rural voters.

• The social democratic party Socialdemokraterna (S) remained the largest Swedish party, despite losing 0.8 per cent of the vote.
• The divide between left-oriented members, and centrist-pragmatics has increased since Januariavtalet, and generated the “internal opposition” Reformisterna.
• Albeit being more resilient than many European social democrats, the party still suffers from voter-flight to SD.
• Many of these voters, leaving S for SD,come from traditional social democratic strongholds, and belong to the rural working-class.
• The party’s EU campaign focused on social issues, labour issues, climate protection and containing right-wing extremism.

Among all Swedish parties included in the analyses, Socialdemokraterna (S) is positoned closest to both its sympathisers and voters, although S voters are more concentrated, and closer to the centre compared to S sympathisers who have a more left- and libertarian and pro-EU attitudes. This proximity between party-position and voters & sympathisers indicates that Socialdemokraterna has a consolidated (perhaps entrenched) voter base, with a high degree of agreement between voters, sympathisers and the party with regard to both the right/left, European Union (EU) and authoritarian/libertarian dimensions. This is consistent with the electoral stability - or marginal decline - of the party in EU elections: oscillating between 23-24 per cent since 2004. S manages to retain voters better than other European center-left parties but seems unable to attract new ones: this is Socialdemokraternas main challenge. Additionally, the value position of S sympathisers is virtually identical to both Miljöpartiet (MP) voters, and Vänsterpartiet (V) sympathisers, which means that all three ‘red-green’ parties appeal to - and compete over - a section of te electorate clustered around the moderate- to centre-left, with a slight preference for libertarian over authoritarian values.

Vänsterpartiet (V) only grew marginally in the election, gaining 0.4 per cent, which was interpreted as a failure of the party to mobilize left-wing voters and establish themselves as the principal competitor of S (which has shifted somewhat toward the political centre after Januariavtalet). The party agrees with S with regard to workers’ rights and the importance of supporting EU’s social policy, with MP regarding raising climate ambitions, and with both in respect to resisting right-wing extremism. Nonetheless, the parties on the left diverge with respect to attitudes toward delegating decision-making power to the EU, where V is more eurosceptic. Like SD, the party has only recently dropped its demands for withdrawing from the Union and is now in favour of changing it from within, but its aversion to supranational decision-making has not diminished. In addition, the party is very critical of the economically liberal policies of the Union, arguing that it prioritizes corporate profits over people. V is also opposed to decisions in favour of enhancing the military capacities of the Union, or allocating additional resources to e.g. Frontex, which it conceives of as a militarization of the Union at the expense of humanitarian solutions and diplomacy. Here, V diverges sharply from both M and SD, who advocate for a stronger Frontex and more efficient external border control. But like SD, V is in favor of reducing EU’s budget, and has repeatedly urged M to support their proposal for limiting Sweden’s fee to the EU.

• Althoughgrowing moderately, members of the left-wing party Vänsterpartiet (V) were disappointed by the results, which were interpreted as a failure to mobilize left-wing voters alienated by Januariavtalet.
• Like SD, V recently changed its position toward the EU: from hostility to reluctant acceptance.
• V now aim to democratize the institutions from within, resist right-wing extremism, and deter militarization of the Union.
• Like SD, KD and M, Vänsterpartiet is opposed to (some of) the supranational elements of the union.
• But in contrast to these parties, V is also critical of the EU’s liberal economic policies and supports the European Pillar of Social Rights.

V is located outside the circle of its own sympathisers in respect to both the authoritarian-libertarian, and right-left dimensions. The party is located too far on the left and authoritarian sides for its potential voters, which could explain its failure to attract voters from S in the election. The distance between voters and the party-position is smaller than the one of sympathisers, but V voters are still closer to MP than V. All three ‘red-green’ parties (S, V and MP) are located to the left of their voters andsympathisers, but the difference between sympathisers and the party-position is significantly larger for V than for S. In order to reach their sympathisers and grow, V might have to more moderate stances along both the left-right and authoritarian/libertarian dimensions. However, if the left-libertarian electorate is saturated, increased competition between S, V and MP will only redistribute a receding voter-pool. Hence, due to the rightward shift in Swedish politics (as demonstrated in the 2019 EU election) and the increased salience of GAL/TAN issues, V might have to balance between retaining their base while at the same time appealing and make concessions to the more conservative voters who are leaving S and V for the right-wing nationalist party SD.

Miljöpartiet (MP) lost 3.8 per cent of the vote, which still puts the party at 11.4 per cent - a significantly better result than in the general election 2018, where it merely received 4.4 per cent. This might indicate that the party’s policies are more appreciated among the electorate at the European level than in domestic politics, but it is rather curious not to see a “Greta-effect” in Sweden - named after the Swedish teen-activist Greta Thunberg - akin to the surge of support for Green parties in e.g. Germany, the UK and France. MP is one of the most GAL/TAN rather than left-right oriented parties in Sweden, bested only by SD, although they are located on opposite sides of the spectrum. Like Socialdemokraterna and Vänsterpartiet (V), MP made the resistance against right-wing extremism and populism a core-concern of their campaign, along with the defence of democracy, the rule of law, women's rights and LGBTQ-rights. But their main focus in the election were environmental issues, such as: raising standards for climate protection (like S and V), introducing a common carbon tax, reducing emissions drastically and rapidly, and devoting 50 per cent of EU’s total budget to the environment. One of the reasons for MP’s failure to gain big in the election might be that virtually all parties have accepted to the climate-agenda, which used to be their niche.

• Although climate-related issues were one of the most important questions to voters, the Green party Miljöpartiet (MP) contracted by 3.8 per cent compared to the 2014 EU election.
• A possible explanation for this might be that virtually all parties have incorporated environmental policies into their programmes.
• The party can be distinguished from the rest by its insistence on the urgency of prioritising the environmental challenges ahead.
• MP is - among Swedish parties - one of the most GAL-oriented parties, making it an outlier with respect to the left-right spectrum.
• The party is hence also strongly opposed to the parties on the opposite side of the GAL/TAN axis, most notably Sverigedemokraterna.

Miljöpartiet, the junior government coalition partner of Socialdemokraterna (S), is located to the left of their voters and sympathisers, while S is almost perfectly aligned with theirs. This indicates that MP voters regard both S and V as second-order preferences. MP voters and sympathisers are also slightly more libertarian and favourable to European integration than the party itself. This mismatch between voters/sympathisers and the party position can be one explanatory factor for their electoral decline in comparison to the last EU election. Some voters might have preferred to vote for a rival party on the libertarian-right side of the spectrum, such as Centerpartiet (C), which is increasingly profiling itself as a ‘green’ party and as an alternative to MP. The main differences between MP and the rest of the parties is related to e.g. achieving a climate-neutral Europe (net zero emissions), higher specificity in the policy proposals and the time-frame: whereas other parties propose to achieve it by 2050 (all except SD), MP aims to achieve this goal as soon as possible.