The Swedish political environment has been subject to significant changes in recent years. Especially important in this regard has been the gradual shift toward GAL/TAN, i.e. Green, Alternative and Liberal values vs. Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalistic values as the new divisive cleavage between political parties, at the expense of more traditional differences. However, the left-right dichotomy largely coincides with the division along the GAL/TAN dimension in Sweden. The most explicit manifestation of this new dimension has been the loosening of conventional bloc-politics, i.e. the division of the parties into two separate coalitions, consisting of centre-right ‘Alliansen’: Moderaterna (M), Centerpartiet (C), Liberalerna (L) & Kristdemokraterna (KD), and the leftist ‘Red-greens’: Socialdemokraterna (S) & Miljöpartiet (MP) + Vänsterpartiet (V), where Sverigedemokraterna (SD) was holding the role as the potential “swing-party” in parliament since it gained parliamentary representation in 2010. This can be illustrated by the parliamentary situation after the 2018 general election, which resulted in prolonged government formation negotiations: a stalemate caused by the even distribution of votes between S, MP and V (40,7 per cent) and M, L, C and KD (40,3 per cent), while SD received 17,5 per cent - becoming the third largest party. Neither bloc could form a governing majority, and neither wished to cooperate with SD.
In January 2019, L, C, MP and S reached an agreement called Januariavtalet, which made it possible for S and MP to govern for another term, provided that L and C could exert influence over the policies and budget of the new government, covering 11 policy areas and several concrete items. Although both L and C have been members of Alliansen since 2004, the increased saliency of GAL/TAN-issues on the political agenda and the “migration crisis” of 2015 has gradually alienated them from their traditional allies; M and KD, who have both moved toward the right/TAN-side of the spectrum since the 2014 general election. The cohesiveness of Alliansen was also undermined by Fredrik Reinfeldts sudden resignation as party leader of M in early 2015, and later in 2016, M’s acceptance of potentially cooperating with SD, followed by a similar declaration by KD in 2019, which both the Liberal Party (L) and the Center-party (C) are opposed to. While KD and M have moved closer to SD toward the TAN-side of the spectrum, sharing similar positions in several issue-areas, L, C, MP and S have moved toward the GAL-side (albeit maintaining their pro-business, market-friendly economic stances).
While Januariavtalet is rather sensible from a value point of view, its future is still uncertain. Nevertheless, it marks an important shift in Swedish politics: the collapse of Alliansen, and the success of an agreement organized around progressive values, rather than a coalition based on proximity in respect to economic issues (e.g Alliansen). Perhaps Swedish politics are undergoing a re-alignment along new dimensions, signified by the emergence of new blocs (rather than the death of bloc-politics) with M, KD and SD on the one side, and S, MP, C and L on the other, with V as the potential “swing-party”, yet it is too early to tell with certainty.
The Parliamentary Situation in Europe and Sweden
There are both similarities and differences between Swedish domestic politics and European politics in general. In both Europe and Sweden, a new balance of power has surged: the traditional dominant forces of the respective political systems - mainly Social Democrats on the one hand, and Christian Democrats or Social Conservatives on the other - are losing their grip on power and are becoming unable to form majorities through “Grand coalitions,” consequently forcing them to rely on green and/or liberal parties to govern. Simultaneously, nationalist right-wing and populist parties are growing, disrupting the established parliamentary process and polarizing the electorate. However, the principal difference between the outcome in Swedish and the general European Parliament election results was the stasis or contraction of liberal and green parties (L and MP) and the growth of conservative parties (M and KD).
Main Political Issues and Electoral Results
Prior to the EU election, questions related to identity, culture and values seem to have supplanted, or at least gained equal importance with economic matters, such as trade and agriculture, which usually weigh heavily in European parliament elections. This change in preferences among the electorate was reflected in various polls and surveys mapping the ranking of different issues ahead of the election, where: 1) migration, integration and asylum-politics, and 2) climate and the environment mattered most to voters, followed by 3) crime prevention and deterring terrorism, 4) defence and security and, 5) the Union’s relationship to the member-states. However, there were crucial differences among voters with respect to the aforementioned issues: 1) and 3) were significantly more important f SD, M, and KD-voters, than to S, V and MP-voters, while the opposite was the case for climate issues and questions regarding the labour-market, workers’ rights, and social justice. Other important topics before the election were peace in Europe, the defence of democratic institutions and values, approaches to contain the rise of populism and resistance against extremism.
The result of the European election in Sweden reveals a general shift toward the right: The three parties on the TAN-side of the spectrum (M, KD and SD) grew by roughly 4 per cent on average compared to 2014, while the three parties on the GAL-side (S, MP and V) contracted by around -1.4 per cent on average. Among these parties, SD grew the most, by 5.7 per cent while MP contracted the most, by -3.8 per cent. The Social Democrats (S) remained the largest party, with 23.6 per cent followed by M with 16.8 per cent SD with 15.4 per cent MP with 11.4 per cent, KD with 8.7 per cent and finally V with 6.7 per cent.
Debates prior to the Election
In the pre-election debates, S repeatedly presented the election as an opportunity to combat extremism of various sorts, but especially the radical right and populists who pose a threat to the fundamental values of the Union, exemplified by the rise of illiberal governments in Eastern and Central Europe: undermining the rule of law, civil society, higher education and media freedom. Both V and MP shared this concern with S, as demonstrated in a debate between MP and SD about the aforementioned governments. MP argued that illiberal governance could undermine the fundamental values of the Union, while SD argued that it is a manifestation of the national diversity such governments wish to preserve in the EU, which is currently threatened by ‘the centralization-mania of EU federalists. S also emphasized the importance of freedom of movement and a common market, provided that it does not favour capital at the expense of labour: workers must enjoy fair conditions and social rights must be improved. S consequently supported the Social Pillar (European Pillar of Social Rights – a framework that sets out 20 key principles and rights to support fair and well-functioning labour markets and welfare systems) along with V. The party also argued that transnational threats (terrorism and organized crime) must be countered by transnational means and thus favoured deeper security cooperation, a stance also expressed by M.
With respect to environmental issues, S insisted on taking decisive action in order to ensure that the goals of the Paris agreement are fulfilled, e.g. by forcing corporations to take more responsibility for their impact on the environment. Among the left/GAL parties, V and MP had the most ambitious climate-agendas, including progressive taxes for airplane travel, raising investments in European railway systems, and devoting more of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budget to sustainable agriculture (MP). Issues related to migration and integration played a minor role in the debates between S and other parties before the election, yet the party insisted on the need for a common European migration policy, while V insisted on mobilizing a “coalition of the willing” rather than attempting to reach a consensus among all member states in respect to migration and refugees.
S and MP were the least “Eurosceptic” parties among the six parties described here, especially in contrast to the three parties on the right (SD, M and KD) and the far-left V. Albeit V and SD are diametrically opposed in respect to virtually any issue, they both changed their approach toward the EU before the election: moving from opposition to the Union toward more constructive attitudes, i.e. they are now in favour of reforming the Union from within, rather than withdrawing from it. What accounts for this change of mind on behalf of the two parties? The protracted process following Brexit played an important role, but also - at least for V - the urgency of environmental issues and the threat from the extreme right.
The aforementioned general shift of the centre-right (M & KD) further to the right on the political landscape was acknowledged by SD, which praised both M and KD for moving closer to their positions with respect to immigration and integration, law and order, defence, security and national sovereignty. M, KD, and SD all emphasized the importance of only delegating complex and “genuinely transnational” issues to the European level, including stronger external border controls to curb immigration by e.g. strengthening Frontex (M and SD), combating organized crime such as transnational theft-leagues, terrorist networks (SD, KD and M) and radical Islam (SD), and promoting free trade and environmental issues, while social welfare issues ought to be exclusively domestic competencies. Hence, they were all opposed to the Social Pillar promoted by S and V. All three right-wing parties also spoke of the “federalist dream of a European superstrate” in pejorative terms, while advocating for a “moderate”, less centralized and bureaucratic union, as expressed by KD’s slogan “Make the EU ‘Lagom’ (Moderate)Again”.