Strategy Debates of Hungarian Parties in the European Elections 2019

Following three landslide General Election wins, the Conservative-Christian Democratic coalition's support is very stable and is projected to win over 50 per cent of the total votes in the 2019 European Elections. Fidesz campaigns with a minimal programme focusing solely on migration, insisting that the EU takes a stronger anti-immigration stance. This is a key element of a larger set of symbolic issues around foreign interference in domestic affairs, targeting not only Brussels but various global philanthropies funding Hungarian NGOs. Despite continued conflict and the suspension of its membership, Fidesz MEPs are expected to take seats in the European Parliament as members of the European People's Party.

The coalition’s broad agenda is a mixture of pro-EU and Eurosceptic elements. Orban is vocal about the need for more guarantees of enhanced national sovereignty within the EU. His more positive 'model' of Europe is based on the example of regional intergovernmental coalitions such as the Visegrad 4. The Fidesz leadership recently denied that Orban would be interested in a 'Eurosceptic coalition' with Matteo Salvini. However, Orban does not endorse Manfred Weber as the lead EPP candidate and keeps suggesting that the Christsian and centre right EPP should seek collaboration partners on the right, not on the 'liberal left’.

• Fidesz takes a traditionally right-wing stance on most policies that belong to the economic left-right dimension and prefers targeted tax relief, for example, for families, instead of welfare payments. Fidesz opposes deepening European integration and refuses to accept EU quotas on the admission of refugees.
• Fidesz is supported by a broad-based coalition of voters, not only those socially conservative and right wing. Its support is highest in rural areas.
• Fidesz' radical stance on immigration overlaps with that of Jobbik's, which contributed to the recent decline of Jobbik's popularity.
• One of the key success factors of Fidesz is its agenda setting power: the government continues to oversee the majority of national-circulation media outlets.

Moving away from its past as a niche anti-communist party in the early 1990s, Fidesz is now supported by a broader-based coalition of voters spanning the entire political spectrum. While the present research confirms that its voters tend to be socially conservative and moderately Eurosceptic, Fidesz voters are not more likely to be on the economic left than on the right – thy are rather evenly spread across the centre of the economic axis. This might be due to the party’s ambiguity on this dimension, as Fidesz prefers to mobilise on a symbolic agenda based on nationalism, migration, national sovereignty vis-à-vis EU competencies, and foreign/liberal interference in domestic affairs.

The heatmaps further suggest that the party sends powerful messages around these issues (especially migration) that are able to reach sympathisers on the more progressive side as well. From the strategy point of view, Fidesz needs to keep hold of some of these moderate-progressive voters to ensure its comfortable ‘super majority’ in any legislative body. As the opposition was unable to make significant aggregate gains, Fidesz easily won the majority of votes in the European Elections with relatively high turnout. The new distribution of power on the left where MSZP ceased to be the most relevant party, however, might lead to a loss of these sympathisers.

Following a few unsuccessful attempts at forming a 'grand coalition' with all parties on the political left, the Hungarian Socialist Party currently runs on a common ticket with Párbeszéd  (Dialogue), following a split within the Greens in 2013, an electoral alliance established in 2018. MSZP has some incumbency advantage on the European level with two seats gained in 2014, but its popularity decreased significantly, eventually gaining only a single mandate. This may be due to a gradual loss of (a) its progressive supporters to newer parties that were able to offer a more credible voice in the fight against corruption (MSZP itself had a fair share of corruption and leadership scandals during its tenure in government) and the loss of (b) some of its traditional support base (pensioners, healthcare workers, educators) to Fidesz itself.

MSZP continues to campaign on a traditional, social democratic agenda, with strong, local figures in a few urban areas. To complement this, Dialogue introduced green elements in the common platform, a number of their politicians having a background in environmental science. MSZP is pro-EU and is a member of the Party of European Socialists.

• MSZP-Dialogue campaigns on a left-wing social democratic agenda. Its most progressive elements relate to environmental protection. The party supports greater EU competencies in fighting corruption.
• MSZP compete with the rest of the opposition parties a large pool progressive and left-wing voters. The largest overlap is between MSZP and DK in terms of its policy programme on the economy, concentrating on wages and pensions.
• MSZP has been subject of internal leadership struggles on multiple levels, resulting in weak party discipline in Parliament.
• Failure factors included a loss of its progressive supporters to newer parties that were able to offer a more credible voice against corruption, and of its traditional support base (pensioners, healthcare workers, educators) to Fidesz itself. On the other hand, MSZP has a number of popular politicians in the EP, with the advantage of visibility.

MSZP-Dialogue campaigns on a left-wing social democratic agenda. Its most progressive elements relate to environmental protection (Dialogue is the new Green wing within the formation), and to the expansion of EU competencies in fighting corruption. The alliance competes with the rest of the opposition parties for a large pool of progressive and left-wing voters, in an increasingly saturated environment.

Despite past successes, the majority of MSZP’s progressive supporters now switched to parties that were able to offer a more credible voice against corruption. MSZP also lost some of its traditional support base (pensioners, healthcare workers, educators) to Fidesz a long time ago. Thus, this might not be a case of the party failing to match voters’ policy preferences, but a case of strategy failure in which the party could not build up credibility after a long decade of leadership contests and corruption scandals. MSZP is still defined by its communist past by virtually all other parties in the electoral competition.

DK is one of the two parties that nearly doubled their voter base since the 2018 General Elections. Rather than winning over voters from the right, DK's apparent rise might be due to a structural change on the left as support for the Hungarian Socialists is on the decline. For the first time since its formation, the DK campaign was led not by its controversial lead, ⁠ex-PM Ferenc Gyurcsany, but his wife, Klara Dobrev, which many speculate also contributed to its success. DK is thus the biggest opposition party at least in terms of electoral support in the European party competition. A big question is whether DK able to hold onto its popularity in the upcoming local elections.

DK is known for its vocal support for deeper European integration, eventually leading to a federal 'United States' of Europe. In other issue areas, DK is a progressive party with an agenda similar to the rest of the opposition parties, calling for an investigation of corruption around the management of EU funds, as well as for guarantees of press freedom. DK supports economically left-wing policies that substantially overlap with those of MSZP, concentrating on pensions and welfare payments. Previously, DK opposed voting rights to be given to ethnic Hungarians without a residence in Hungary.

• DK supports a deeper EU integration with a vision for a Federal Europe. DK overlaps with the opposition on progressive policies and especially with MSZP on economic left-wing issues related to wealth redistribution.
• DK directly competes with MSZP to address a traditionally left-wing support base on the issues of pensions, trade unions, and wages.
• A key question about DK's future success is that about leadership. DK leader and former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany has been rejected as an ally unanimously by virtually all opposition parties. The current success does suggest, however, that fresh faces might be helpful in attracting support.

In the 2019 competition for progressive and left-wing voters, DK emerged as the most successful party. On issues relating to the EU, DK continues to take the most extreme position by calling for a European Federalisation. Its success in securing the majority of the pro-EU votes might be due to the clarity of its position on this issue. DK supports economically left-wing policies that substantially overlap with those of MSZP, concentrating on pensions, wages, trade unions, and welfare provision.

Our data suggests that DK sympathisers may be slightly less progressive than the party itself. While some of this might be explained by the distribution of Hungarian voters around the median voter position (which is more conservative), it also suggests that the linkage between DK and its supporters is not exclusively based on the party’s election program. In the current elections, DK ran with a lead candidate whose ratings were more favourable than the ratings of DK’s official party leader, which suggests that personalities mattered as well. This might be a key success factor if the party is to ensure that it holds onto its success amongst the many opposition parties with overlapping agendas.

Momentum's European Election results of nearly 10 per cent are surprising for a party with limited experience. Its young activists gained media exposure in 2017 for initiating a referendum to oppose investment in the 2024 Budapest Olympic Games. Since then, Momentum had limited success in the 2018 General Elections but managed to keep its significance from outside the Parliament, using civic platforms. In the 2019 European Elections, Momentum was the runner up in a number of urban locations.

Momentum advocates progressive and pro-EU positions on most issues. The party pushes for the euro to be introduced in Hungary (currently not on the government's agenda). Accepting that refugee quotas might be rejected by many Member States, they propose a system in which quotas can be traded, similarly to emission quotas, in bilateral agreements. Momentum positions itself 'beyond' the left-right dimension, appealing to centrist, young, and metropolitan voters, as well as to those voting from abroad. Key to its strategy is the presentation of a centre or centre-left alternative to the left-wing opposition parties. The party will join ALDE in the European Parliament.

• Momentum's EP election programme consists of a set of pro-EU proposals including more cooperation in military affairs, defense, security and environmental protection. The party proposed a tradable system for refugee admission quotas. In its General Elections programme, the party endorsed centre-left policies including progressive taxation.
• Key in Momentum's strategy is to attract voters that are generally dissatisfied with the current opposition especially due to internal struggles.
• There are several points of overlap across Momentum's policy proposals with LMP and Dialogue on climate change as well as with others on accountability and media freedom.

While advocating pro-EU and progressive policies, Momentum positions itself 'beyond' the left-right dimension, appealing to centrist, young, and metropolitan voters, as well as to those voting from abroad. Though such an idea of ‘centrism’ is not new in the current political landscape, Momentum is the only party successfully carry out a centrist campaign in the 2019 European Elections. Our data suggests that Momentum voters are more centrist than the voters of DK and MSZP – overlapping mostly with the voters of LMP and Jobbik. 

The central question about Momentum’s immediate future is whether such a strategy is viable on the long run and in other election types. Interestingly, both LMP and Jobbik had previously benefited from distancing themselves from Fidesz and the left wing parties at different times, but both appear to have lost most of that support by now. In local elections, Momentum might have less leverage in selecting who stands as a ‘unity candidate’ than a more established left-wing party. Likewise, centrism might not be enough to carve out a sufficient vote share during General Elections where the element of proportional representation is very small and traditionally left wing candidates might have more chance in replacing a Fidesz incumbent. 

Jobbik (‘Movement for a Better Hungary’) emerged as the radical right-wing alternative to Fidesz in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Its radical members have routinely used xenophobic and anti-Roma language in the name of criminal justice. Following a number of new developments, however, inducing Fidesz' issue ownership on migration and the continued need for electoral alliances in the opposition, Jobbik launched a more moderate programme, first fielded in 2018. Jobbik's radical wing split from the party and competed on a separate ticket for the 2019 EP elections, called 'Our Homeland'. Jobbik suffered substantial losses in electoral support nationwide and lost its position as the strongest party in opposition, at least on the European level.

The Jobbik programme remains firm on anti-migration but features a number of key progressive and pro-EU policies. These include a wage union within the EU in the name of fairness, larger autonomy and more funding for education, equality between men and women in a broad sense including equality of wages or an equal distribution of care taking responsibility within households. Jobbik joins the opposition calling for greater EU competencies in sanctioning the management of EU funds by the national government.

• Jobbik is a radical anti-immigration party but with pro-EU elements in its programme. These include a proposal for a wage union and the extension of EU competencies in fighting corruption in Hungary.
• Jobbik has been successful in addressing a broad segment of the citizenry, especially in rural Hungary, including left-wing voters. It achieved this primarily through putting emphasis on symbolic issues such as crime and corruption.
• Jobbik's strategy is heavily influenced by the political environment. To present itself as a viable coalition partner, the party has de-radicalised and took progressive stance on a number of social issues such as gender equality.
• Jobbik's radical wing, Our Homeland, split from the main party in 2019. Jobbik's support decreased substantially, with the party securing only a single MEP mandate.

Our data captures an important component in Jobbik’s strategy. Since its foundation as a radical right-wing party competing on an agenda based on anti-immigration, crime and ethnic conflict messages, Jobbik decided to embark on a ‘centrist turn’ for at least two main reasons. Firstly, Fidesz itself radicalised and took ownership of migration and nationalism. This made it difficult for Jobbik to keep its support base on these issues alone. Secondly, Jobbik realised the need to collaborate with the rest of the opposition parties in case an electoral alliance could replace Fidesz in office. Thus, Jobbik adopted a number of left wing and progressive policies such as wage equality, gender equality and environmental protection, in order to present itself as a viable coalition partner.

Looking at the spatial position of Jobbik’s voters and supporters, we can confirm that it does now draw support based on a more moderate and progressive electorate. This strategy, however, may have been short-lived as Jobbik lost significant support in the European Elections. It makes sense to speculate some of that went to Momentum given an overlap across the two parties’ sympathisers, but also to a lesser extent to its own radical fringe party, Our Homeland which split from Jobbik in 2018. 

LMP (‘Politics can be different’, the green party of Hungary) was formed and gained early momentum during the 2009 European elections. While running with limited appeal on a green and urban agenda, LMP has consistently attracted votes in the 5-10 per cent region in all subsequent national and local races, despite leadership battles and breaking ties with its own left-wing. Key to LMP's strategy was to take an equidistant position between the programmatically similar opposition parties on the left and Fidesz on the right. Many speculate this strategy failed by 2019, as LMP failed to gain enough votes for a seat in the European Parliament and lost its supporters to Momentum and DK.  

Besides action on climate change, the LMP program includes proposals for action against tax competition, taxing large scale financial transactions and capital gains. As a green party, LMP is pro-EU but remains critical towards globalisation and promotes 'localism' where decisions are being made at a level closest to whom they concern. LMPs vision of Europe is about balance between national sovereignty and cooperation. Member States should be able to make sovereign decisions over migration management, provided that they are governed by the principles of humanity and fairness.

• LMP is a Green party with an element of globalisation criticism and the promotion of 'localism'. This results in a mixture of policies that call for more European integration on environmental protection on the one hand, but for less integration in the management of migration, on the other.
• LMP's key strategy has been to keep distance both from the right wing Fidesz and the left wing opposition parties, presenting a centrist alternative to voters disaffected by the weak opposition. This strategy though unique previously, now overlaps with that of Momentum's, and the latter proved to be electorally more successful in 2019. LMP lost its only seat in the European Parliament.
• LMP's internal debates continue around the issue of cross-party collaboration.

As a green party, LMP is pro-EU but remains critical towards globalisation and promotes 'localism' where decisions are being made at a level closest to whom they concern. While being coded as a left-wing progressive party given its issue positions, LMP has strived to present itself as an independent alternative in its rhetoric, a party that is distant both from Fidesz and MSZP/DK. Therefore, LMP voters occupy the political centre.

From a strategy perspective, the problem is that this pool of voters decreased by the 2019 European Elections. Dissatisfied with leadership debates within the party, moderates might have switched to Momentum, while more left-leaning voters to DK or MSZP. LMP lost its own left wing in a 2013 split when prominent politicians formed Dialogue, a party more open to collaboration with parties on the left.