The Netherlands elects 26 MEPs to the European Parliament by a proportional representation (PR) system, as a single constituency. The 2019 European elections resulted in a surprise outcome, as the social democratic Labour Party (PvdA) defied all expectations and opinion poll predictions to become the largest party, obtaining nearly 19 per cent of the vote – an increase of nearly 10 per cent compared to 2014. Many opinion polls suggested that widespread Eurosceptic sentiments throughout Europe would spur the rise of electoral support for far-right populist parties as was the assumption in 2014, when polls also predicted a strong showing for the far right. However, in 2014 the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDA) surprisingly held on to the largest number of seats and the staunchly pro-European D66 won the largest share of the vote. In 2019, the victory of the centre-left PvdA – running with a pro-EU campaign – showed again that anti-EU attitudes may be overestimated.
Only 2 months prior to the European elections, the Dutch party system was rocked by the rise of newcomer nationalist party Forum for Democracy (FvD), led by Thierry Baudet, which emerged as the largest party in the March 2019 Dutch senate elections, just edging out the conservative liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) of Prime Minister Mark Rutte.
This growth of right-wing nationalism was surprising, given that FvD competed for the first time in the 2017 parliamentary elections, winning only 2 out of 150 seats. The rise of FvD came partly at the expense of veteran far-right populist Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV). The voter exchange between nationalists was even more clear in the European election, where PVV lost all its seats. One in six voters supported PVV in 2014 (13.3 per cent), while in 2019 FvD obtained 10.9 per cent of the vote and the PVV 3.5 percent. Support for nationalist, anti-immigrant parties seems fairly stable, hovering around the 15 percent. A similar proportion (14.7 percent) was the combined result of PVV and FvD in the 2017 parliamentary elections, which means that turnout effects might not be as important as often suggested. One should note, however, an interesting difference between the electorates of FvD and PVV. While PVV appeals more to lower educated and lower income, or economically precarious middle-class voters, FvD also has substantial support among highly educated voters (mostly employed in the private sector).
A Social Democratic Surprise
The real surprise of the 2019 European elections – for experts and the political elite alike – was the strong showing of the social democrats, given that PvdA had lost 19 seats in parliament in the 2017 elections, dropping from 24.7 percent in 2012 to a mere 5.7 percent in 2017.
Electoral volatility in the Netherlands is high, particularly on the left, where the field is crowded with political parties holding relatively similar positions – despite important differences in their political orientation. Progressive, left-leaning voters often contemplate two or more parties, deciding between the PvdA, the GreenLeft (GL) and the pro-market social liberal Democrats 66 (D66) only late in the campaign. This ‘doubt on the left’ can certainly have benefitted PvdA, which shifted nearly half a million votes from March to May into its column, while D66 lost nearly 400 thousand and GL nearly 200 thousand votes in the same time period. Another factor that may have contributed to the victory of PvdA was the appeal of ‘Spitzenkandidaat’ Frans Timmermans, who was selected as the frontrunner of the centre-left Party of European Socialists (PES) for the post of European Commission President. Perhaps the prospect of having a Dutchman as head of the European Commission played a role for voters on the left and centre. There was certainly a surge in support in South of the country – where Timmermans is from – and where PvdA increased its support six-fold.
One on One
Another factor could have been the campaign, which was framed by many media outlets as a race between Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s VVD and Thierry Baudet’s FvD. There was a televised debate between these two leaders, focusing on themes dominating the debate on the right: immigration, law and order, border controls and even ‘Nexit’, although FvD is internally divided on the matter of leaving the EU. Nevertheless, FvD was relegated to fourth position, being beaten by VVD, as well as PvdA and CDA.
This heavy focus on right-wing issues and only two players – both unacceptable for many Dutch voter s- may have irritated many and drove them to the moderate PvdA and CDA. Voters on the left and in the political centre are more concerned with socials justice, environmental protection, climate change and economic stability than the cultural agenda of the right.
Baudet even expresses doubts about the effect of human activity to climate change, which is not a big vote winner in a country as progressive as the Netherlands. Given that large sections of the country are below sea level, many voters do worry about climate change. Since for many climate issues require and international effort, a ‘Nexit’ is also not very popular. The vast majority of Dutch voters - particularly those on the left – have no appetite whatsoever for an EU-exit modelled after the British Brexit. The total chaos in the British Conservative and Labour Parties after the Brexit referendum increased opposition to a Nexit and even increased overall support for European integration. Unsurprisingly, FvD became ambivalent about a full ‘Nexit’ and now support holding a referendum on the issue.
A Dutch Euro-Scepticism?
Overall, Dutch voters have doubts about the direction of the EU and its functioning, but only a small minority wants to abandon the project of European integration. This is one of the reasons that the moderate forces on both the left and right did much better than most had expected. The VVD even gained a seat, and thus may argue that the ‘horse race’ against the nationalist FvD paid off. The CDA lost 3 percent of its support in 2014 and one seat. CDA and VVD are both in government (in coalition with D66 and the confessional Eurosceptic ChristenUnie) yet did run a relatively EU-critical – even mild Eurosceptic – campaign. This contradicts their overall support for international initiatives such as the Global Compact for Migration.
The soft Eurosceptic junior coalition partner ChristenUnie ran on a joint list with the staunchly conservative, protestant orthodox and anti-EU SGP, with whom they joined the ERC in the last European Parliament. However, since FvD joined ECR, the two confessional parties left the soft Eurosceptic group and are now not affiliated with any established bloc in the European Parliament. They maintained their 2 seats, relying on a largely stable electoral support, that is not affected by electoral volatility to the same degree as most other Dutch parties.
The largely pro-EU attitudes of Dutch voters may have also backfired on the radical left Socialist Party (SP). The party elite is highly critical of the European Union, due to its main focus on the free-market and open labour market, which affects low-skilled work and welfare state provisions. However, in their campaign the SP decided to attack Frans Timmermans personally, portraying him as a Europhile that was selling out Dutch interests in Brussels in close collaboration with the right. Unfortunately for them, Frans Timmermans campaigned on taxing large companies and expanding worker protection, which created a substantial dissonant between these messages. Many left-wing voters decided that Timmermans was a better bet than the SP.
The predominance of climate issues in the minds of voters on the progressive left explains why the GreenLeft (GL) is gaining support over several elections. In the parliamentary elections of 2017, the party became the largest force on the left, doing extremely well in the local and provincial elections as well. In the European Elections this trend upward was maintained, and the party improved its record compared to 2014, gaining one more seat. Nevertheless, the environmentalists could not become the largest left-leaning party in the Netherlands once more.
In sum, anti-EU attitudes were not the dominant factor in the 2019 European Parliament elections. Pro-EU parties increased their share instead. The heavy focus by the media on nationalist, anti-immigrant rhetoric may have actually mobilised the pro-EU vote. While this election should not be interpreted as the end of unease about European integration – of which there is still an abundance – these anxieties do not automatically translate into massive support to abandon or even downgrade the European project. Illiberal and radical anti-EU stances are primarily driven by anxieties of immigration and the economic effects of open borders, not by a total rejection of a European coordination mechanism to tackle global problems and compete with other global players such as China and the USA.