Strategy Debates of Dutch Parties in the European Elections 2019

The social democrats – who became the surprising winner of the 2019 European elections – are a profoundly pro-European integration party, although some in its voter base are much more reserved on the matter. The PvdA sees expanding the capacities of the EU as the only way of ensuring citizen’s protection against global challenges such as climate change, as well as the pressures on wages and welfare states through the globalisation of capital, labour automatisation and economic digitalisation. The social democrats consider that unity in the EU is pivotal for ensuring that these issues are tackled successfully and believe that nation-states alone are not up to par with the challenges of an ever-globalising world. Nevertheless, the party is critical of the role (multinational) corporations have on EU decision-making and argues that European legislation should reflect the interests of these multinationals less and cater more to the needs of the Union’s citizens. The party wants to introduce a tax on the profits of digital giants such as Google and Facebook, which resonates positively with large majorities among European populations. It is also in favour of introducing an EU-wide minimum wage as a guarantee of income cohesion within the EU and as means of ensuring fairer labour market competition in Western Europe, where seasonal workers from the East are often employed for below minimum wages. The party is also very progressive with regard to moral/ethical issues and wants to see LGBTQ+ rights institutionally expanded across the continent.

• PvdA is a staunchly pro-EU social democratic party
• PvdA’s top candidate in the European election – Frans Timmermans is the “Spitszenkandidat” of the Party of European Socialists (PES)
• The party has campaigned on the message of putting people before profit, taxing digital corporations and pressing for legislation that would reflect the interests of citizens, rather than multinationals
• PvdA is in favour of introducing an EU-wide minimum wage as means of curbing the negative effects of the open labour market on worker’s wages
• PvdA has a strong human-rights protection and expansion track-record and is in favour of introducing cross-European legislation that protects the rights of the LGBTQ+ community

As revealed by the heatmaps, the Dutch Labour party is located towards the left-end on the economic axis and adopted a rather moderately progressive position on the EU/social axis. While some of the unexpected electoral success of the Dutch social democrats in the 2019 European election could be attributed to the party’s spitzenkandidat Frans Timmermans (empirical analyses heave shown that positive evaluations of Timmermans are among the main indicators for PvdA support), one should not underestimate the effect of the PvdA’s strategic position. PvdA voters and sympathisers share very similar stances on both dimensions of the political landscape: they are left-of-centre and moderately pro-EU/socially progressive. In the 2017 parliamentary election the PvdA relied on a strategy of cultural polarization, which ultimately proved harmful to its electoral performance. This time around, the Dutch social democrats adopted more radical economic stances, and rather moderate positions towards EU-related and cultural policies. This proved more in tune with its voter base, as both actual voters and sympathisers are very much aligned on the cultural axis. With regard to economic issues, the PvdA adopted a more left-wing position – a strategy of moderate economic polarisation – which most likely made it attractive to dissatisfied SP voters (the party relied on an attack-PvdA campaign) and other voter groups that are dissatisfied with ongoing austerity, economic liberalisation and welfare state retrenchment.

While the vast majority of PvdA-voters are located almost exclusively in the left-progressive quadrant of the landscape, its sympathisers have a greater variety of political orientations, with many of them professing pro-market economic stances, and a small fraction being socially conservative. This suggests that the Dutch social democrats are still a centrist catch-all party that is able to appeal to voters in the political centre. The balance for social democrats is always to moderate its economic and cultural stances to such an extent that economically centrist and socially conservative voters are not deterred, while support of left-leaning, progressive voters is retained.

Forum for Democracy is a relatively new Eurosceptic party which attracted massive electoral support in the Provincial elections and European elections in 2019. The party was founded in February 2015 as think tank around the young conservative public intellectual Thierry Baudet. In late 2016, Forum for Democracy registered as a political party. The reason for transitioning from a think-tank to a party resulted from the refusal of the Dutch government to veto the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which had been voted down in a referendum initiated by, among others, central figures from FvD. It ran under a manifesto that focused on democratic reform, Dutch independence from the EU and limiting immigration.  Through active (social) media campaigns, this nationalist-conservative party seems to successfully appeal to voter groups beyond the traditional turf of the far-right, particularly among the (educated) younger generations. The party siphons off former PVV voters, but also attracts protest votes from other centre-right voters, enabling it to increase its vote share from less than 200 thousand votes in the 2017 parliamentary elections to more than a million in the Dutch senate elections of March 2019. In the European elections the party was not able to reach such levels of support and came in fourth place with roughly 600 thousand votes.

Fighting the party cartel is an important element of the platform of the FvD: in their view the fact that members of established parties divide government jobs is the biggest problem of the country. As an alternative, they want to introduce a Swiss style system of direct democracy. Animosity towards the EU is the core of FvD’s rhetoric. The party considers that European integration has gone too far, and that European governance has become completely undemocratic. FvD is critical of what it sees as “cartelisation” at the top of EU management. The party contends that it is no longer possible to reform Brussels and therefore proposes a referendum on the Netherlands’ EU membership, although it initially favoured Nexit without a people’s vote. FvD is also in favour of re-introducing border controls between EU member-states and dropping the Euro as a currency. The party has already been plagued by internal quarrels over Nexit and other issues: Henk Otten – the leading FvD candidate for the senate, criticised leader Thierry Baudet for pushing the party to the far right and argued that it should take a pragmatic approach towards the EU and not leave at any cost.

• FvD is a far-right nationalist party highly critical of the EU
• Established in 2016, FvD quickly gained national prominence and is currently the major Dutch Eurosceptic party
• While supporting an outright Nexit initially, the party has moderated its stance and is now in favour of holding a referendum on the matter
• FvD is very critical of the way the EU is governed and considers it deeply undemocratic
• So far, FvD leader Thierry Baudet has been uncompromising with party representatives who do not share his vision

The main benefactor of the 2019 European election was Baudet’s FvD. Shortly prior to the 2019 European elections, the far-right nationalists FvD implemented a strategic shift in their position regarding the Netherlands’ EU membership. The party dropped its proposal for a complete and immediate withdrawal from the EU – a ‘Nexit’ – and instead suggested that they would favour a referendum on the issue. This more moderate – and much less risky position, in the face of the total Brexit disaster evolving in the UK – resonated well with the Europhile section of the Dutch electorate. When we look at the overall strategic position of FvD, we see that the party is economically to the right of its core electorate, yet well aligned on cultural issues. Since the issue of immigration and European integration override the saliency of other issues among these right-wing voters, this position worked well for FvD. Note, for example, that quite a few voters with left-leaning economic preferences still voted for the fervently right-wing FvD. These voters are very ‘forgiving’ on economic issues, as long as the party emphasises its anti-immigration and anti-EU stance. Looking at the heatmap of FvD voters, one can clearly see that the party has attracted moderate soft-Eurosceptics as well as more staunch critics of the EU, who have arguably voted for PVV in the past. This is clearly evidenced by an ‘ideological split’ of FvD voters, who are concentrated in a right and Eurosceptic position, as well as a more centrist and less Eurosceptic one. FvD sympathisers are more uniform in their ideological build-up and clearly more moderate than the party’s actual voters. This suggests that FvD could also appeal to centre-right voters, who do not hold staunchly Eurosceptic views.

The Freedom Party is the most Eurosceptic political force in the Dutch Party system. Formed by Geert Wilders, after he left the conservative liberal VVD, the party initially adopted staunchly pro-market issue-positions and focused predominantly on curbing immigration, particularly from Muslim countries. Given that its voter base is comprised of a disproportionally large number of working class and lower educated middle class voters, PVV gradually moved to the political centre, in economic terms, adopting pro-welfare and social investment stances. The party advocates for an immediate Nexit, arguing that this would enable the Netherlands to enact a strict immigration policy, and that the country will be better off negotiating trade agreements on its own, rather than within the EU. The PVV believes that Western democracies are under the threat of ‘Islamisation’, and deems Islam incompatible with democratic principles. This far-right party promotes the notion of “the Netherlands first”, arguing that national sovereignty has been severely undermined by existing EU treaties and this is unacceptable in their eyes. For the PVV, law and order policies are tied to their nativism: for instance, they favour the expulsion of criminal immigrants, even if they have a Dutch passport. PVV relied on a rather stable electoral support until the emergence of concurrent nationalists FvD, which managed to successfully appeal to large swaths of former PVV voters, using very similar messages, albeit presented in an arguably more substantiated manner. As a result, PVV’s representation in the Dutch senate has declined, while the party lost all its seats in the European Parliament.

• PVV is the most anti-EU party in the Netherlands, in favour of an outright Nexit
• PVV leader Geert Wilders was initially a MP for the centre right VVD
• PVV is very critical of immigration and Islam
• PVV’s electorate is predominantly comprised of lower-educated voters
• Electoral support for PVV has been in decline since FvD entered parliament in 2017

Being the most socially conservative party in the Dutch political landscape, PVV also caters to the most socially conservative, anti-EU and anti-immigration fractions of the electorate. The party is very well positioned in line with the epicentre of its core voter base, as can be seen from the heatmaps. This position may be somewhat exaggerated, as on economic issues the PVV tends to “blur” their stance (purposefully adopting ambivalent positions, as so to highlight the radical positions on other issues, primarily immigration and EU). Since many of its voters and sympathisers regard the saliency of the immigration issue of overriding concern, this strategy worked well for the PVV in most elections since 2005. However, the close proximity between the PVV and its voter base on both the economic and cultural axes did not help the party in 2019. Primarily due to the ‘new kid on the block effect’ – media attention to Geert Wilders and his PVV diminished, sucking all the oxygen out of his political campaign. Since the party is a one-man show – becoming a member is not possible - the PVV has no membership party and no activist base – the success of the party is solely dependent on the publicity for its leader. The rise of Baudet’s FvD and Baudet’s ability to lock prime-minister Rutte into a ‘horse-race’ of the leading candidates, reduced the visibility of Wilders to practically zero. This is also what happened to the number of seats for Wilders party: the PVV lost all its seats in the European parliament.

VVD is an economically liberal, pro-market political party with moderately conservative stances on ethical issues, immigration and European integration. While the party is, in principle, pro-European, and is part of the liberal ALDE group in the European Parliament (together with D66), in recent years it has adopted soft-Eurosceptic stances and favours more restrictive immigration policies. Such stances, increasingly visible among liberal parties, are often expressed prior to elections to capture votes that would otherwise go to populist, Eurosceptic nationalist parties. At the same time, the VVD signs up to international frameworks such as the Global Compact for Migration and the Paris Climate Agreement. A similar ambivalent position by liberals can be seen with regard to the EU: while it generally supports European integration, the VVD opposes further deepening of European integration and EU enlargement, citing security, corruption and law and order obstacles in aspiring member-states. For similar reasons, VVD also opposes granting Schengen membership to external EU-border states such as Bulgaria and Romania. Yet, the Dutch liberals are in favour of more EU law and order policies, such as strengthening the role of Frontex in EU’s external border protection. The VVD also favours downsizing the European Commission.

• VVD is a centre-right, pro-business party with moderately conservative views on ethical issues
• Prior to elections, VVD often relies on soft-Eurosceptic and anti-immigration rhetoric – a strategy aimed at attracting swing voters sympathetic with the far-right
• VVD is opposed to the further integration and enlargement of the EU
• VVD is in favour of strengthening the security at EU’s external borders

The pro-market conservative liberal VVD managed to obtain one more seat in 2019, compared to 2014 – a considerable achievement for an incumbent party. This was partly due to the fact that Rutte became engaged in a ‘horse race’ with Baudet, competing for right-wing voters. There was even a separate debate between these two leaders on national television, in a country where more than a dozen relevant parties compete for seats. As traditional representatives of both the larger (multinational) corporations as well as the small entrepreneurs and shop owners, the VVD cannot be totally anti-EU, as European integration is still by and large a free-market project. As the heatmaps clearly show, the VVD positioned itself very strategically on the cultural/EU axis in this European election. The VVD is positioned moderately on the EU-critical side so it can compete with the anti-EU parties on the right (PVV and FvD), but at the same time the party is not too far from its core voters to alienate them. Note that the majority of VVD voters and sympathisers are actually more pro-EU than the party. The ambivalent position of the VVD - somewhat critical of European integration but very supportive of free trade within the Union and an open labour market – resonated well with centrist voters and did not alienate potential supporters. Cleverly, the attack on the truly anti-EU parties in the VVD-rhetoric signalled positive messages to the party’s moderate voter base. Looking at the heatmap of VVD sympathisers, it is clear that there is a substantial proportion of Eurosceptics among them, allowing the VVD to both ‘home in the base’ and gain on the EU-critical side of the political spectrum, gaining a seat over its result in 2014.

While never holding national government office, the environmentalist GreenLeft party became the largest political on the left in the 2017 parliamentary elections. In line with the pro-EU policy line of European green parties at large, GL is a proponent of deepening international cooperation, as means of achieving its environmental protection and climate change prevention goals. The party wants to see an EU that runs solely on sustainable energy in the foreseeable future. GL is opposed to allocating public funds to fossil fuel industries and proposes closing coal-fired power plants by 2030. The environmentalists want to see a reduction of CO2 emissions by expanding and strengthening the railway transportation networks across the EU: they also favour heavy investment in developing fast-rail connections between all European capitals. GL proposes the introduction of an EU-wide minimum tax rate for corporate profits, which would mean that the EU is granted tax-collection powers. With regard to immigration, GL wants to see a comprehensive common asylum and immigration policy and an overall humanitarian approach to immigration. Considering economics, the party wants to limit the role of market forces in the public sector, particularly with regard to municipal services.

• GL is an environmentalist party and is currently the largest left-wing party in the Dutch parliament
• The party’s core massages have to do with environmental protection, which it deems possible only as a result of strong international cooperation within the EU and beyond
• GL wants to introduce an EU-wide minimum tax rate for corporate profits, closure of all coal-fired power plants by 2030 and expanding the railway transportation network of the EU
• GL favours a comprehensive humanitarian approach to immigration

The environmentalist party GroenLinks (GL) is the most progressive left-wing party in the Dutch political landscape at this European election. The party combines staunchly pro-EU stances with appeals for wealth redistribution, while stressing the urgency of climate change action and environmental protection. While GL voters and sympathisers are concentrated in relatively similar positions, the former are clearly of more diverse ideological build-up, spanning from far left to politically very centrist, moderate positions. GL has also adopted a strategy of libertarian distancing, being way more progressive than its electorate. However, the environmentalists also adopted a very left-wing stance to match it. This could be the reason why this strategy paid off at the election booth. In the 2019 European elections, GL gained one seat compared to 2014 and had already become the largest left-wing party in the 2017 parliamentary elections. Libertarian distancing, the party strategy of employing much more progressive stances than the median voter appears to benefit green parties which have been consistently advocating further European integration and hold libertarian stances on social matters. Other parties, in particular social democratic ones, which adopt a similar strategy tend to be punished by voters, as the large degree of overlap between the policy proposals of the centre left and the environmentalists, tends to benefit the latter in an age of ever-increasing saliency of climate-related and environmental issues.

The Christian Democrats have historically been the party of Dutch agricultural producers, enjoying strong support in rural regions, as well as among the broader middle class. Unsurprisingly, the CDA is a vocal proponent of maintaining European subsidies for agriculture and is also supportive of increasing general investments to rural regions, as means of circumventing the widespread population decline in such areas which has increased in recent decades due to urbanisation. In the light of rising Eurosceptic sentiments and increasing opposition to immigration, CDA, just like VVD, opposes further European integration and favours policies and institutions that strengthen the EU’s external border security. The party is critical of delegating more powers to Brussels, arguing that European integration leads to the loss of traditional norms and values, which should be subject to national expertise. Similarly, the Christian Democrats believe that national governments should have a greater say than the EU in dealing with domestic policy, such as healthcare, welfare provision, housing and education. At the same time, the Christian democrats also emphasise the importance of environmental protection and an energy transition towards cleaner technologies. While the CDA is profoundly pro-market, sometimes there are critical voices within the party that point towards the economic and social dangers of unchecked globalisation and open borders. However, at the national level, the party usually adopts pro-business stances and favours budgetary discipline, austerity and economic deregulation.

• CDA is a Christian Democratic party with strong backing in rural agricultural regions
• CDA’s core messages in the European elections were that more investment should be allocated to rural regions and that agricultural subsidies should remain in place
• CDA is opposed to further European integration which it sees as a threat to traditional norms and values
• CDA argues that national governments should have a greater say in specific policy domains, such as healthcare and education

The Dutch Christian Democratic party has a moderately pro-market stance on economic governance and is located on the moderately conservative, anti-EU side of the cultural axis. The party competes with the other centre right party VVD, as well as with the anti-immigrant parties PVV and FvD, which is why it adopts a moderate Euro-critical stance but is by no means Eurosceptic. Generally, the CDA performs well in European elections, largely due to backing of centrist and loyal voters, and its broad support base in rural agricultural regions. As we can see, the CDA has positioned itself very close to the core of its voter base, yet slightly to the right and to the conservative pole. This allows the party to appeal to both its core voters and maintain a viable competitor for the broader right-wing electorate. Interestingly, most sympathisers – from which possible electoral gains could be made – are situated more to the left and progressive quadrant. Despite many observers proclaiming vast levels of polarisation, the voter base of the Christian democrats is still largely centrist on both dimensions: CDA voters appear to be almost equally distributed across the left and the right, yet a small plurality of them seem to adopt predominantly centre-left and moderately pro-EU/progressive position. The ideological profile of CDA voters suggests that the party still has a catch-all appeal and can attract to a wide plethora of moderate voters. CDA sympathisers, on the other hand, appear to be less ideologically diverse compared to the party’s voters. The fact that most potential and actual voters are more pro-European than the party itself indicates that the CDA faces a difficult balance of remaining competitive among traditional centre-right voters, as well as appealing to its centrist and pro-EU core.

D66 is a social liberal party known for its staunchly pro-European integration position which was exemplified by the slogan “For Europe” in the 2019 European Parliament election campaign. D66 is in favour of expanding Brussels’ competences and argues that more investment in Europe is necessary and to the benefit of all member-states. In line with this, the social liberals are the only Dutch party in favour of establishing a common European army. The party is a proponent of technocratic solutions in policy making and contends that political decisions should be based on scientific research. D66 has consistently been supportive of progressive policies in the sphere of minority rights and drug decriminalisation. While the party – and many of its voters- are economically centrists, at the cultural level the party is fully libertarian in promoting personal freedoms. In line with that, D66 campaigns on issues concerning privacy protection, press freedom and gender equality and the party is critical to (European) governments that undermine them. The party notably favoured instruments of direct democracy in the Netherlands, such as directly elected mayors (who are currently appointed by the Crown) and binding referenda. However, D66 reversed its position on referenda following several plebiscites where anti-European measures were approved by Dutch voters, albeit with a very low turnout.

• D66 is a centrist social liberal party with strong focus on promoting research-based technocratic governance
• D66 is a proponent of deepening European integration to the degree of federalisation – which it sees as means for achieving social and economic progress
• D66 supports the further democratisation of political decision-making, yet it has recently adopted a position against referenda
• D66 favours expanding and promoting minority rights and gender equality across the EU

The majority of both D66-voters, as well as sympathisers are positioned in the progressive and pro-European side of the political landscape. Surprisingly, much of its core voter base is far more moderate than the party concerning EU and cultural issues. On the economic dimension (at the European level at least) the party is well aligned with its voters and sympathisers. It is important to emphasise this detachment: the heatmaps suggest that D66-voters and sympathisers are not necessarily fully in agreement with the party’s staunchly progressive and pro-EU stances. The vast majority of both voters and sympathisers are much less Europhile than the party itself and are much closer to the position of its competitors PvdA and GreenLeft. This suggests that, in general, the segment of the Dutch electorate that votes for pro-EU parties is rather moderate in its support for progressive and EU policies. This closer proximity of much of the D66 voter base to the other competitors may have contributed to vote swings towards PvdA and GL. Moreover, D66 sympathisers are more widely ideologically distributed across the political spectrum than the party’s voters, suggesting that centre-right voters comprise a substantial proportion of D66’s sympathiser base.

 This strategy of libertarian distancing – i.e. adopting very pro-EU stances – may have cost D66 some of the votes it obtained in 2014. Were the party’s positions radically different in 2019 than in 2014? Most likely not, which suggests that the root cause for the electoral loss could be that adopting radically pro-EU and culturally progressive stances does not pay off in the current political climate of widespread Euroscepticism. Another possible explanation is that the party’s left-wing voter base simply considered D66’s participation in government – with three right-wing parties – a reason to punish the party in this second order election.